R. Am I right in thinking - again I'm considering some of the chapters that I wrote and mentally, sort of, proofreading some - that he was a fairly peppery G.O.C.-in-C.? To put it another way, I get the impression that when I first met him and began to know him fairly well that he had mellowed a great deal from the period when he was brigade commander, divisional commander, sometime acting corps commander. I may be wrong, I just don't know.

F. Well I would say George as a military commander during the period when I was at his headquarters, that he was a man . . . you soon came to know that he wouldn't tolerate anything slipshod or that he wouldn't tolerate any undue familiarity or anything being other than properly run. But this isn't to say, or to imply that the atmosphere at his headquarters - in my recollection anyway - was not a strained one. It was not one in which you were always in terror. As I say you came to know that you had to perform, you were expected to perform and that, yes I would say mistakes, mistakes were sometimes inevitable and not the result of sloppiness, that you were apt to get a pretty crushing sort of of any mistakes, but you just had to take it.

R. He was a man who didn't suffer fools gladly, shall we say.

F. Right, and sometimes, perhaps, judged that you were a fool because a mistake had been the result of something you had done or failed to do whereas it was not because you were a fool, but . . . not necessarily because you were a fool. Well that atmosphere, that attitude, I think it can be said that everybody then performs at top level of efficiency. While it's hard sometimes, especially if the blow descends

on you, nevertheless it's in the interests of . . . . I don't recall, frankly, whether I ever - at least I have no vivid recollection of ever having the cloud of the general's displeasure descend on me. I seem to recollect on one occasion being told to stay out of the way for a while by a more senior officer . . . that I'd be better off if I wasn't around.

R. Were you there when he went from G.O.C. of 1st Div. to Acting Corps Commander for a bit? When McNaughton was sick, I think in the winter - as I remember - of 1941-42 and Pearkes took the corps for a while and then - he had it for several months - and then Crerar came over.

F. I rather think I was. Let me see - my recollection is that I went over in January of 1941 with the unit I think until about the fall and then went as liaison officer and then I came back to staff course in Canada in - March of '42? - so I would have been at Division Headquarters in the winter of '41-42.

R. Because one of the great unanswered questions in the book is the reason for Pearkes not getting the Corps, and Crerar coming over and taking over. Let me put it another way. From 1939 onwards Pearkes was continuously involved in training manoeuvres, bringing first the brigade and then the division up to an absolute peak and then he had the Corps for four or five months, if my memory serves me right, and then he in turn was replaced by Crerar who was his equal during the '20s and '30s and then Crerar in 1939 had a staff job at CMHQ and continued doing staff work until he took over the Corps. Now I understand that it was a political appointment, but there is just no proof, no proof at all. Pearkes ultimately was

taken back, as you know, to Canada to become G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command. I guess there is some question here how well he got along with McNaughton, and how well, or how not well, he got along with Montgomery. I get different reports on Pearkes and Montgomery. In some ways I feel that they may have been just a little bit too much alike, but this I'm just not sure of.

F. I'm afraid I can't be helpful to you there because, again as a young lieutenant and not having an army background at all and not intending to go on with military service after the war, I wouldn't be in the know. I'm sure there was some gossip flying around, but I would not have been the recipient of any well-informed comment.

P. Now the next time you would have very much to do with him, presumably, would be when you came back in '45 and you become a member of parliament. Now let's roughly take it from there. I'm right, am I not, in thinking that this would be the first time that you would be elected to parliament and it would be his first time, and Harkness's first time. Three of you new from British Columbia.

F. Yes.

P. Now I try to describe in the chapter you read something of what it might have been like as a brand new member of parliament in Ottawa. I don't know if you remember that particular part of the chapter. Can you add anything to that? Have I left out anything?

F. No, I don't think so. I don't think you have left out anything. Perhaps I would agree and be inclined to underscore what you said when you said in effect that the transition from a senior military commander

with the attitude that I have described - you know, everything must be done, the general had to be served - the transition from that to a member of parliament on his own, recognizing he was a new member of parliament - members of parliament were simply all equals but new members were, in terms of the House and getting around, a little less equal than the older members, the more senior members. Nevertheless, of course, George's position would . .. nobody would try and treat George as a young . . . or a man of no significance. But still, the atmosphere in parliament is very different, something all its own, and it was amazing that George showed so little of what they would call side, it was really amazing the way he fitted in to the atmosphere of parliament and where, certainly in those days especially, staff and assistance were non-existent - you had one secretary between two members, no research assistant, no nothing. You had to do it yourself, you had to learn the ropes, new ropes. Of course, he had a lot of friends in Ottawa, but mostly in the military, so that he certainly would have ready access - as you point out and as he says - to . . . . But he never took unfair advantage of it, but if he wanted information which a member of parliament was entitled to he would know where to go for it. To that extent, in that section a secretary's work may have been alittle easier but, no, I don't think that would make . . . . He still had to do the digging and he did everything - as all of the other new members he did everything for himself and he just fitted in in a manner, in view of his background, was amazing. That, to my mind, cast a very real light on his character. George was, and is, a man with no side

and what public attitudes he adopted - if in the army his attitude was one of fierce efficiency, it was because he felt he had to be efficient. This was the way to get results. But where he didn't have to be fierce and demanding, he wasn't. He was just one of you, one of us. I was always impressed by that fact.

R. Now I gather from the - again as I mentioned in the chapter - that from the time when you meet in the fall of 1945 that there is what I call for want of a better term, and I think it's a fairly common term, a sort of a shadow cabinet set up; in other words, that you have groups within the Opposition who take care of . . .

F. Committees. We organized ourselves into committees, roughly one committee - no, not in the early stages when we had sixty something members - we usually had one committee looking after two departments . . . but I think there was just the one committee on defence - it may have had external affairs as well - and the chairman of that committee to some extent became known as the member of the shadow cabinet in opposition.

R. Now, Pearkes became chairman I gather, and I understand that you were on it and that Harkness was on it - now who else, I'm not sure and neither is Pearkes.

F. Larry Skey, I'm quite sure. He was a Wing Commander in the Air Force. He was a member during that first parliament, '45-49 and I don't remember offhand whether Larry was re-elected in '49. And I think Cecil Merritt was on it as were all those you mentioned were also on the veterans' affairs committee.

R. Well now, would he be selected more or less as the natural senior . . . ?

F. I think so.

R. And how did it operate? This is one thing I'm not too terribly sure of.

F. The members were asked to indicate to the Whip what caucus committees (this is distinct from the parliamentary committees) they would like to serve on. You put in your names and, perhaps three or four of them, then when the returns were complete the Whip's office would arrange for a meeting of all the members who had indicated that they wanted to be, say, on the defence committee. Those members would meet and their first job was to elect a chairman, vice-chairman and secretary from amongst their number. Then from there on the committee went on about its own organization and its own tasks. The primary responsibility, obviously, was to take under consideration any bills introduced by the minister or the department for which they were responsible, to discuss the bill, to make recommendations to caucus as to the attitude that the party should take in the House on the bill and then to organize the debate in parliament. The chairman of the committee couldn't say, "You're not on my committee; you can't speak." But he was responsible, for instance, for working up the list of speakers, submitting it to the Whip who in turn submitted it to the Speaker of the House. He had a responsibility which was never written down, but it was his job to see that he and his committee worked out what aspect of the subject would be covered by what speakers, the object being to have an organized presentation of both the constructive views and the criticism of the Opposition with

respect to the measure under consideration. And the same with the estimates which, of course, were always a major part of the work of parliament. The House of Commons in those days when the estimates were discussed in full on the floor of the House, the chairman of the appropriate committee would be responsible for organizing the position of the attack and the criticism, etc. of our party with respect to the estimates which includes the policy generally of the government.

R. There was one point I remember asking Mr. Harkness. I didn't get - now mind you, he was in hospital with shingles - and my point in brief was this, that in 1945 the coming of the atomic bomb, you have almost a right turn on military thinking and military strategy so that even a person such as yourself and Harkness and Skey and Pearkes and so on, had the long experience of the Second World War, here was a new weapon and later a weapons carrier with which certainly none of you had had any experience, and to a degree would be unfamiliar, and in brief how does one go about learning about this new weapon and the strategy that would go with it. Evidently there was no . . . you know, you had no Hudson Institute, there was no think-tank in Canada or anything of that nature. It was merely a matter, shall we say, of reading Time magazine and such magazines as you could get hold of.

F. Yes and the military journals. You must appreciate the defence committee was not really one of my major, although I tried to take an active part on it - the veterans' affairs committee and the justice committee fairly soon became committees on which I played a more important part. But in the defence committee, as I say, George would have access to - and I can't say this of personal knowledge, but I should be very surprised if he didn't subscribe to military journals

and quarterly reviews and so on. They would all be in the Library, the Reading Room downstairs. The resources were very slim and the Opposition was not in a very favourable position to arrange such matters as interviews with visiting distinguished firemen, you know. If the Chief of Staff of the U.K. or Washington was at . . . we really didn't get any access to him and I rather fancy that George would have been able to enter into correspondence with these people because of his record and his associations of the past. But the job really was . . . you had to scratch around and get your information as best you could and then sit down and think it over and try to keep yourself reasonably well informed and reasonably well up to date with very limited resources.

R. This must have been quite a problem. You know one thing that I'll have to do in the chapter coming up which will deal with Pearkes as an M.P., as the Opposition's military critic, I'll have to describe that twelve-year period between 1945 and 1957 and what he was doing and thinking in that period. Then he gets into office and he's given a job. Now what he says frequently in the period when he is an M.P. clashes with what he is faced with, shall we say, in 1957 when he has all the facts in front of him and one wonders quite frankly, to what extent under those conditions where - not only in '45 or '50 or '55, but right up to 1957 where the weaponry is becoming more and more complicated so that you almost need engineering papers to understand them - to what extent can the Opposition offer viable alternatives to what the government is presenting?

F. Only to a very limited degree. That's the disadvantage of it. Some

effort is made to offset that disadvantage now so that in theory you have a more intelligent, informed, and therefore useful debate, by providing the Opposition with research staff, but it is still very minimal and I think that always you will have the fact, the problem that you put forward in good conscience when you are in opposition certain views which when you have all the facts as you do when you become government, you realize were perhaps not those which you would put forward if you had all the facts as well as all the responsibility. So again I seem to recall without detail, as any Opposition will do to any government, new or old, try to embarrass you by inconsistencies. George - I just have a general recollection - sort of rolled with the punches and said, "that was the view that I held at the time and I held it honestly and conscientiously - I have changed my mind." And he had a manner, a charm of manner that would enable him to get away with that, you know, to blunt the attack.

R. He seems to be and to have been a very sincere man and to have captivated a number of people by his sincerity. What he is saying he believes at the time to be quite true. What about the attitufe held by the Conservatives on the matter of conscription? Did this ever come up? I haven't investigated this myself but it's interesting.

F. Yes, my recollection is that it came up from time to time, but that the decision, or the recommendation of the Committee and the decision of caucus was that we should not make it an official plank. Well, that we should not make an issue of it. I rather fancy that if a

a Conservative government or a government constituted of the then Conservatives, had been formed and another major war had come in which Canada was involved, that we would have adopted conscription as a policy - national service policy - I think that was George's view. But we weren't a government, there was no war imminent and that would have been dividing the country and there seemed to be no point in our getting into trouble in advance when it wasn't necessary to do so. There was some difference of opinion, I think - I can't recall the details - with respect to the Korean War where the government, as you recall, adopted immediately the policy of voluntary service and urging upon the veterans of the Second World War to enlist in the Korean Force. I expressed myself very strongly in criticism of that view and I am afraid that I got carried away and I felt this about it, I said publicly that I hoped that no veteran would enlist in order to enforce the government to a policy of selective service, and I think that George and some of my othere colleagues. . . . That was never adopted as a policy!

R. Well I know that - let me see - no it would be before he went actually to parliament - after he was elected in '45 but before he was a member of parliament, that certainly Pearkes publicly, was urging Prime Minister King that there should be conscription for the force going to the Pacific. There is no doubt . . . in other words he said, "You have conscription, for heavens' sake why call upon the people who fought for so long in Europe to come and volunteer again to go to fight in the Far East", and I rather suspect that there

would be a large number who would be in favour of that but, again, that was just before VJ Day.

F. Frankly I don't remember what our official policy with respect to service in the Korean War was. I know it didn't support my view that veterans should be publicly dissuaded from enlisting but whether we went to the point of saying that there should be selective service in the form of conscription, if you like, I don't recall. I'm afraid I can't help you on that.

R. I'm one chapter away from the period of Pearkes as Minister of Defence and that will come up and I just haven't done the thinking to that as yet that I should have. There is one other question and it is something that I didn't realize until two weeks ago when I began to read some of the newspaper clippings that Mr. Ladner loaned me a couple of weeks ago and that is the early friendship, and evidently a close friendship, between Pearkes and Mr. Diefenbaker. Now when I say I didn't realize it, and the fact that I was surprised at it, is after these many interviews with Pearkes, and perhaps the present way of how he looks upon Mr. Diefenbaker today. Evidently it is certainly not the way he looked on Mr. Diefenbaker back in the forties or early fifties but I gather they were fairly close friends in that period.

F. Yes, I would think so. I wouldn't disagree with you. I don't recall seeing them together a great deal excepting in the House, and I do recall that George would, as many of us did [would have difficulty at first as a member of parliament], because Diefenbaker was an experienced parliamentarian. He was a man who took a sympathetic

interest in new members, tried to help them, and he was a fascinating man so that one was frequently dropping into his office and my general recollection is that I saw George Pearkes, or encountered him doing the same thing frequently but not the kind of friendship, at least it wasn't evidenced as I recall by their going about outside very much together and I must say that I was somewhat surprised when George nominated Dief in the '48 convention. I would have thought he would be more inclined to nominate George Drew but it was obvious that their friendship had established itself to that extent at that time.

R. Well, of course, when was that? Was that '47 or '48?

F. It was '48 I think.

R. That's fairly early. What I was trying to figure out actually is why this friendship would become established - Diefenbaker on the Prairies, Pearkes on the Coast. Their two careers and backgrounds, etc. were completely different, and what might have brought them together - this is what I was trying to. . . .

F. I think just John Diefenbaker's personality at the time and one couldn't fail but admire his performance in the House, his record of service to the party and to the country, as well as his personality. And he was genuinely interested in helping new members, advising them, and I think that, you know, this is a legitimate gambit for anyone who has aspirations ultimately to be leader of the party to cultivate people within the party who would be of influence and of significance as supporters when the right time arises. Now I

don't think that Diefenbaker cultivated anyone only for that purpose. I am quite sure that there was a genuine friendship grew up as well but it is not an improper thing for an aspirant, one day to be leader of the party, to be cultivating people within the party.

R. Some mentioned that it might have been because Pearkes was very well known, you know, as an outstanding soldier in World War I with the V.C., D.S.O., M.C., and all that sort of thing, which Diefenbaker admired because - how shall I put it - evidently/limited he had participation himself in the First World War. Now I understand that Diefenbaker was a veteran, let's say, at least he was an officer and that he went overseas but what the devil he did, I'm not sure - but it's certainly not in Who's Who, or anything like that.

F. No, my understanding is that he suffered an injury in training, a manoeuvre. Either a wagon or a truck or something ran into him and that he was severely injured, severely enough to into and out of it and sent back to Canada. Why that's just part of the record. The fact that he never got to France is not John Diefenbaker's fault; he was there and available, but like many other Canadian soldiers who became seriously ill and died on Salisbury Plains without going to France.

R. But it does sometimes happen, I know, where a person didn't make it himself and he becomes . . . he has a terrific admiration for some . . . and he includes himself in that.

F. I think that might well be an aspect, an element in friendship, because John Diefenbaker is, as you know, an enormous commonwealth

man, an empire man, and admired tremendously people who made any contribution and therefore George Pearkes who was a hero from the First World War in the Canadian Army, saving the Empire, would be a man upon whom Diefenbaker's admiration would fasten.

R. And then, of course, the. . . .

F. Also the other things in his career - coming to Canada as a young man, R.C.M. Police, the [time spent] in the North and so on. All those are things that would appeal to Diefenbaker and strike a responsive chord.

R. Youre right. I must say he is one of those whom I haven't interviewed. I don't know whether I should try - what the opportunity might be like. I will be going to Ottawa for a couple of weeks, maybe I should write him a note.

F. Might well be worth your while.

R. Another thing - the next time, when you have the leadership convention in '56 and you have -- '57, was it? -- No, December, '56.

F. You're right.

R. . . . and you have the situation which is described in various books of Pearkes seconding the nomination of Diefenbaker - now I don't know whether you have read, you probably have, such books as Sevigny's account of what happened. One reads about it in one or two other books - Renegade in Power had a bit on it. In other words, why at that time Pearkes seconded the nomination. I have one story on it but I wonder if you know anything about it.

F. I imagine, even though I don't know anything about it, I imagine he did so because he was asked and pressed to do so. I have never discussed that in detail with George but it would be my impression and

and I think what you say, and the chapter I have read bears it out, that while you said you wouldn't go into any details, still it was probably a mistake but when Diefenbaker insisted George felt bound to accept, and I am quite sure in George's case - I shouldn't say quite sure, but I doubt very much if, in George's case, there was perhaps too much appreciation of the way this would be received in Quebec. I expect he felt that perhaps an instinctive . . . just because it is customary, this is traditional, for an English-speaking and French-speaking proposer and seconder.

R. I gather that, in fact I understand that Pearkes never gave any speech or even part of a speech in the House in French.

F. I don't think so. I don't recall that he ever did. I don't know whether he had any command of French at all.

R. I remember him saying one time, several years ago when I was interviewing him, there was quite a bit in the paper about bilingualism in the forces and all that, he said that if there was bilingualism in the Army when he first joined up that he would still be a private. That's quite possible. . . . Then, of course, comes the election of 1957 and the party gets in, and yourself and Mr. Howard Green and Pearkes become cabinet ministers, I think you are - what? You are three out of about - how many were there from British Columbia - 6 or 7 that were elected?

F. In '57 - yes, I think there were only 7 or 8 at the most.

R. Now there are a number of things on which Pearkes spoke quite a number that I have -- a page and a half. But again these are defence matters and again to what extent you might be able to help me or can help me, I'm not sure. There were in the beginning - one

of the great questions, of course, is the position taken by the Conservative Party which, in essence, at this point is the position taken by Mr. Diefenbaker with respect to Canada's acceptance of nuclear arms both for the forces in NATO and, of course, much later when we get the Bomarc for the forces here in Canada. This is one big question. The other, of course, is NORAD and the position made with respect to that. Now I understand, and you get almost two stories - you get one from Pearkes, you get one from Foulkes. They're not different stories but they are stories with a different emphasis on them. When the Conservatives were elected and really even before the complete Cabinet has been nominated by Mr. Diefenbaker, I gather that he had to go overseas to attend a Heads of Commonwealth meeting and that he took Pearkes with him, and prior to his going over in the aircraft, he was handed a number of papers by the then Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, General Foulkes, and among them was the question, indeed, of Canada accepting nuclear weapons and the question of Canada joining NORAD. Now this was a major decision which normally would be made, or at least it would be discussed by . . . what would be the term?

F. The defence committee?

R. The defence committee of the cabinet where you have just about three or four ministers. Now, what happened in essence is that Pearkes saw Mr. Diefenbaker and Diefenbaker at this time was not only Prime Minister but he was also acting as External Affairs so that when the two met, really you had the three meeting. In External Affairs, owing to people who were on leave or absent or what have you, there was very little, if any, consultation there. It just happened that on that day when a sufficient number of people were away and

that it was really the two of them who made the decision with respect to our acceptance of nuclear arms and later this would reflect back off on the NORAD bit. Now again, you in all probability, were so busy with your own department that you may not have known much about it - I don't know.

F. No, I don't know anything of the background of the papers that may have formed the basis of the decision or the discussion, if any, in the defence committee of the cabinet. No, the first that I recall of it, and knew of it, was when the decision itself came upon cabinet.

R. And that would be. . . ?

F. Well the NORAD one, I think - quite early, I recall. I was not aware that there was a firm decision taken and the cabinet papers would show in the public record.

R. The public record?

F. No, no - the Decisions of Cabinet Papers would record the decisions of cabinet. I don't recall - but I am not saying that it didn't happen - I don't recall the nuclear arms or the nuclear weapons thing coming up that early. I do recall that NORAD did and that my recollection is that cabinet went along with it readily. I don't recall it being a case of the Prime Minister coming in and saying this is the decision, do you agree with it? But rather it was put before cabinet in the normal way as a recommendation from the minister for discussion round the table and decision.

R. And this evidently, the decision - or at least the recommendation - had gone before the St. Laurent government and according to Foulkes - Foulkes told Pearkes that, you know, the Liberals had decided in favour of it, that they were just waiting to get re-elected and

therefore there should be no opposition from the Liberal side of the House once this is approved, and it was almost like the Conservatives rubber-stamping, shall we say, a decision which surely all of Canada would agree that the defence of North America is indivisible and yet when it does come up, I gather that the Liberals attacked the Conservatives on the basis that they didn't go through the proper channels and all that. In other words, just a bit of nastiness in the House but one of those problems.

F. Yes. Again my recollection is a bit vague on it and I don't recall they attacked it strongly at the outset. I do recall after a year or two had gone by their attacks and criticism became sharper on the basis of somehow we were by joining NORAD, as I recall it just as a criticism, we were going to have to along willy-nilly with decisions made in the United States, which doesn't seem to me to be an apt criticism at all. Once you accept the principle that the defence of the North American continent is, as you say, indivisible - well, in the case of an emergency, the United States is going to have to play the major role whether Canada is a partner or not, and if we are not a partner, we have much less chance of influencing the decision than if we are a partner even though we were junior partner.

R. This again is a debate, oddly enough, that one is beginning to hear in my circles - oddly enough it has been brought up several times this past year - in other words (and this does not refer to any political party), to what extent can we, or indeed have we ever, influenced the American decision with respect to any major policy decision that they may have made? This idea that, say Canada in NATO,

Canada in NORAD, is also re-inforced by the concept that - well, we may have a small force but we do have a voice in the Commons, we do have a voice with the Americans, we do have this, that and the other. Well, has our voice ever been listened to, that you know of? This would be almost perhaps an impossible question because it's the mental attitude, I suppose.

F. Yes, as you say, it is really an almost impossible question because who can say whether their decision would have been quite the same if we hadn't raised our voice to the extent to which they may have modified plans or the decisions they were going to make. Ultimately, the decision may go their way but I certainly couldn't document it. If I made the statement that I was sure that we must have beenable to modify it - I certainly couldn't document it. On the other hand, I don't think anyone can disprove or prove the contrary, that we were never successful in affecting a major decision so I think that while there are certain areas in which we must maintain an absolute independence of judgement and decision, insofar as absolute independence is possible, in the area of defence where you are bound to be dealing with an emergency, that the better position is to agree beforehand on what pooling of resources and pooling of judgement there should be and then endeavour to make it a genuine pool in which they all participate. And I would still defend the concept of NORAD on that basis.

R. Well I can't help but think, that, you know, it is perfectly true that just because you have a border along a meridian - heavens, a missile is not going to stop at the border and go straight down or anything of this nature. There has been a fair amount of comment, again in books, which is not - although from what I hear I think is fairly true, and I may be overstating things here - that in cabinet, more

especially in '58, '59, that one could almost describe - almost is an overstatement again - describe Pearkes as the hawk and Mr. Green as the dove with respect to atomic weapons.

F. Yes, it may be over-simplifying it, but . . . as a distillation of the positions, yes I think this would be about correct.

R. This, of course, causes, I know - well not only Mr. Diefenbaker a great deal of embarrassment as time goes on, but. . . .

F. But again, it's my recollection - and I could be wrong - I do not recall, put it that way, very much discussion in cabinet on the nuclear arms issue while George was defence minister. Certainly the crisis developed during Doug Harkness's tenure.

R. Yes, that's true, because even though you were in the process of getting the Bomarc, the Bomarc actually didn't come until Pearkes,

I I believe, had left. In other words, the decision to have the Bomarc. . . .

F. Yes, I think that may have been made then, but they didn't come and again my recollection here is that the question was not - the issue was not put to cabinet in such a way as that you were aware, or speaking for myself I was not aware, that there was any commitment or decision with respect to nuclear warheads, taking the nuclear warheads, once we got the Bomarcs. I was not aware of that as being, indeed, a decision that had been made or should be made at that time. I was not aware of that as an issue until Doug was minister.

R. Is that right?

F. Now that's my recollection.

R. Well you probably remember - and again this must be. . . .

F. There is a controversy, is there not? My recollection is borne out, I think, by my further recollection that there have been statements made that at the time when we agreed to take the Bomarc, it was at

least implicit if not explicit that we would take the nuclear warheads and I recall that being denied, in effect, by Mr. Diefenbaker and I think by Mr. Green, and if that denial is correct that would confirm my recollection that this was not put to cabinet as an issue or as a part of a decision at the time when the decision to take the Bomarc was made.

R. And yet we had under our . . . control a certain degree of nuclear weapons in Europe for the NATO . . . .

F. Yes, I think that came earlier, that decision came and was made earlier. But I am only saying that my recollection is that the situation with regard to the warheads for the Bomarc is as I described it, because again my impression is that Doug Harkness said - you know, it may not have been explicit, but it was certainly implicit and we are in effect, (a) it's a wrong decision not to take them, and (b) it's a reversal of our position and a - not a betrayal, but a letting down of our allies.

R. I remember one thing, Pearkes saying to me when we were talking about this (he was thumping his fist on the table at the time), that John Diefenbaker never did understand the two-key system. Now, Mackenzie King, historically, to my mind really never understood and indeed, he feared things military. I don't think that all the implication of military affairs . . . didn't get into his brain, except the fact that he didn't want conscription. In other words, you can do anything but, for God's sake, let us not have conscription. Mackenzie King, of course, had no military background whatsoever - Diefenbaker had some . . . . Do you think this was a mental block, that

he didn't want to understand it, or that he had been convinced by Mr. Green that we shouldn't have atomic arms and therefore he didn't really understand, or . . . ?

F. I would say there are two factors invovled there. First, that John Diefenbaker's whole personality and character is the antithesis of what is regarded as the military personality and character, and I think that this is not just an idle piece of psychoanalysis - I think it's a fact that John's type and the military type just are opposites and they have no empathy. There is rather an antipathy than a sympathy. Secondly, and I think this clouded, with this basic fact, the experience with the Avro Arrow operated very forcefully to increase, if you like, the antipathy almost to a distrust and dislike of a military adviser, because Diefenbaker always felt - he may not have put it into words publicly, but I am satisfied that he always felt that we had been jockeyed into the position of cancelling the Avro Arrow by the military and by some other advisers, senior advisers of the government that we should never have got into, and that the facts or situations were misstated if not misrepresented, and I am satisfied that he . . . .
So with that background of the natural antipathy and the working of the Avro Arrow thing on that natural antipathy, by the time it came to the nuclear warhead thing it was very difficult for the military advisers to get their point of view accepted, taken seriously - I say taken seriously that they were recommending it, but taken as being the authoritative, if you like, an authoritative view let alone having it be accepted.

R. And yet again I can remember Pearkes saying in one of his interviews with respect to the Arrow aircraft, that after the decision was made

and the announcement made and all the rest of it, that one of the former Liberal cabinet ministers sidled up to him and said that "if you didn't do it, we would have had to."

F. Yes, that I believe to be a fact. But we did it and I think it was one of the elements that was troublesome there is that we were told, you know, "if it's going to be done, it's got to be done now - it can't be left for another moment", and John, I think (Mr. Diefenbaker) felt that we were pressured unduly into that sudden decision - chop! - which no doubt had adverse political effects on us. The military were dead set against sort of phasing out, they said if it's going to be done it's got to be done now. So Diefenbaker again would be inclined to . . . . "Damn military, you see, they've got no common sense."

R. But again, I've heard that he took a long, long time to make that decision and that Pearkes was tearing what little hair he had out of his head, because from his point of view once he had examined it and examined it thoroughly that the ruddy thing was costing millions of dollars every single day and that the millions of dollars that were going on the Arrow meant that he couldn't get the money that he wanted to buy equipment and all the rest of it. But he found it extremely difficult to get a hard and fast decision from Mr. Diefenbaker - to make this decision because of its political implications.

F. Oh yes, yes, entirely, and Diefenbaker did ultimately go along with the decision - or, you know, accept the decision of cabinet and make it his own thereby, and because it worked out - or its effects, if you like, were as bad as he had anticipated at the political level and to some extent at the economic level, that is in terms of employ-

ment and losing our expertise in the aircraft industry, or a large part of it - he felt in a sense, you see, "I was right and the military was wrong" and while we all accepted the need for decision still somehow the decision shouldn't have been made in that manner. So if that would be an accurate analysis this would again tend to perhaps further dispose Mr. Diefenbaker to believe that this judgement should be accepted rather than that of the military because they'd "got no common sense, they've got no understanding of the political issue, the real thing. They could only see one narrow aspect of it." And I'm sure that was, again as I say, in the Bomarc matter and nuclear warheads, that attitude to the military advisers . . .

R. And I gather this, again from General Pearkes, that he tended to look upon not only military advisers, but evidently others as, shall we say a Liberal lieutenant-general, Liberal major-general, Liberal brigadier-general. In other words these are all Liberal . . .

F. They're all part of "them" - "they say . . ."

R. It must have been rather tough, to put it mildly. Now there's one thing that interested me with respect to the decision that Pearkes made - it was an unpopular decision. I remember this because to me - I was writing the history of the Canadian Scottish at that time and I was with the regiment - very shortly after he came in you may remember that he decided that the militia regiments would lean much, much more heavily than they had been on the civil defence side. In other words he was going to train them not in atomic bombs sort of thing, but in aspects of civil defence. Do you remember anything about that - perhaps the attitude of others at that time?

E. Davie Fulton Interview, May 10, 1972

F. My recollection, such as I have, of that is that I don't think that would actually involve a cabinet decision, because the role of the militia -- it wasn't as though it was decided to take them out of a military role altogether, either as being the nucleus of an expanded force should the war come, or to stop military training. It was more in a sense, a department decision of which the cabinet was made aware, but there was no feeling, as I recall, that we should have been consulted and it was a decision that should have been made at the cabinet level, because it was rather an assumption of an additional role and to some extent a down-playing of the traditional role rather than a reversal or a complete alteration of role. But I do remember that it had the effect - well, I remember the background of it was that - one of the problems in the background was should a great deal of money be spent to equip the militia with up-to-date weaponry so that they could be trained in that. This would have been very expensive and there was some question in some minds whether the militia were of sufficient numbers, and if you like importance, to warrant this whereas at the same time there was a view that civil defence was very important and that unless you build up an organization almost paralleling the militia you would have nobody to do it. So why not give the militia that role which was an important role in the overall - in the defence of the country taking an overall view of defence and that therefore it was not something which the militia should not be asked to undertake. In fact, it was something that they should be asked to undertake and if it meant, as I say, an expansion or a different emphasis on their role, that this was

a proper thing to do. I became very aware shortly afterwards - I think at that time I had just become Honorary Colonel of the Rocky Mountain Rangers which is the regiment in Canada - there was resentment and I thought some misunderstanding of the concept of the role as being the basis upon which they had been asked to undertake it. There was certainly a feeling, explicit if not implicit, that, you know, "we joined the militia to be soldiers and now we've got to play around with . . . ." I felt that that was not a really fair or realistic attitude.

R. I have a little image of General J.A. Clark writing you one of his letters on that topic! From Pearkes' point of view - and I can appreciate that you go back in time mentally, when there was a great deal of talk then and a bit before then, about what would happen in the event of an atomic warfare, that the only forces worthwhile would be the forces-in-being because once the atomic bomb joined on one plan of transportation, communications systems and all the rest of it, if a soldier had a rifle and six rounds of ammunition every shot that he fired could not be replaced because you just couldn't get it to him - this broken back theory. And Pearkes says that if they didn't have that role, if they weren't given that role that the militia may have been disbanded entirely. In other words, to him this was one way of saving the militia.

F. I think that's - again it may be an oversimplification, but I think there's an element of basic logic in that in view of the current attitude, not just on the part of the government but throughout the country towards the militia and military effort. But the other -

it seems to me the basic justification for the decision was that you couldn't start in the middle of an atomic war to organize your civil defence personnel and yet you had to have some . . . be able to repair damage to some extent, you had to be able to carry on the business of running a country or else you were hopeless and helpless and were overrun, and since it was too late to start building it up then, you had to build it up before. And that, as I said earlier, to build it up in any meaningful way would be an organization as big as the militia, and you had a militia, why not use them for this role which, in terms- as I say, of the concept of the defence as a totality, not just a shooting arm, but also an arm to enable the country to keep on running, that this was as important a job as the shooting job. And indeed, in terms of the timing there might be no shooting to be done in Canada if we were attacked . . . but there would be an immediate job of re-organizing and saving lives and getting some semblance of organization and transportation, etc., going again and this was one of the most vital functions that you'd have to perform at that stage of time, or that moment of time, and that therefore it was perfectly proper to ask the militia to undertake it, to get ready for it.

R. I know, even in the period when Pearkes was in Opposition he raised several questions, actually, one can see that he attempts to implement when he becomes Minister of Defence - this bit of civil defence was one. Another one that he appeared to be in favour of was some degree of integration, in other words where you have the padres and the medical services, but not the . . .

F. Not unification.

R. No, not unification and the green-bottle uniform and all that sort of thing. He seems to have been very much in favour of increasing - and this is rather interesting - the amount of money spent on research and development, which I found rather interesting. But he . . . in Opposition he goes out for that fairly strongly. Another one of his . . . .

F. George, in firm outward characteristics, as I said earlier - implied it, perhaps implied earlier - may have appeared to be a brass hat, but George's mind was never . . .

R. And yet you know, this is the worst thing, in a way, about it because as you say, he gives the impression - and this is the impression in the minds of a great many people - of being a"Colonel Blimp" - the white hair, the moustache, the V.C., D.S.O., etc., etc., the British accent - the whole bit, and this is one thing that I want to try and destroy if I possibly can. He's not stupid. I don't think for a moment that he's an intellectual; I think he's intelligent without being an intellectual; I think he has a tremendous sense of duty, that he would be, for want of a better term - well, we'll use the term sincere - I was going to say he's a straight shooter. He says what he thinks. If he is Minister of Defence he wants the best equipment, the most number of men and hardware that he can get, and he's not going to worry too terribly much, perhaps, about what this is doing to External Affairs and Mr. Green trying to . . ..

F. Yes, I think that's a fair judgement.

R. But of course, he - now this again is my judgement - I think one of his biggest problems, quite frankly was Mr. Diefenbaker insofar as him trying to do what he wanted to do. I don't know.

F. You see, Mr. Diefenbaker always reserved to himself, as a prime minister has to to some extent, the right to make the political decisions and if in his view the political decision was more important than the other decision of the moment, then in effect he overruled. And yet he would, towards the end anyway, present a very little discussion of the political decision.

R. I can see, too - one has a sort of a mental image of this - from his point of view, if I'm Mr. Green, if I'm hammering in favour of non-proliferation, getting rid of atomic weapons, keeping your hands clean, standing in front of the world as, you know, the nation with the hundred thousand miles of undefended border and this and that and the other thing, the nun in shining white robes, or something like that - I can see where this would have a tremendous appeal to the prime minister, whether it be Diefenbaker or anyone else, and he would be sort of reaching out for that. And then in comes this war-like man, Pearkes saying "well this may be true, but I love peace also"- and there's no more peaceful man than a veteran - but look, you've got to have . . . bustling up the barrel."

F. And here's the logic of the situation - yes.

R. Sort of an emotional vs, perhaps, the practical situation, which, of course, he never did solve, to my mind.

F. No, I think not.

R. What would you say - let me ask you this, perhaps two last questions - what would you say first of all were Pearkes' most outstanding contributions as the Minister of Defence in the three years he had it?

F. Well, I think NORAD, although the background may be correct that

the former government had approved it in principle and would have implemented it, nevertheless we did. We had to make the decision for ourselves and it was done. It may not have been all that enormous, but I mean we talk of those things that happened while George Pearkes was minister, I think this was a major decision and a major accomplishment. I don't know that there are others that immediately come to the front of my mind, but if you have a list of things that were done I'd be glad to see if I have any comment.

R. We'll take a peek at some of those.

F. A courageous decision, the Arrow, although in effect in a sense that's a negative decision, but it was a courageous one and I think the right one...Well, and to the extent that although as I told you I was not aware of it perhaps profoundly because my recollection is not complete - I was not aware that the decision on the Bomarcs was - oh yes, of course, that was made while George Was Minister, to take the Bomarcs, to establish the bases and I think to have American personnel here. That's a fundamentally new element of Canadian defence policy, or was then, and I think it would have to be put down as a major decision.

R. Some people have expressed surprise considering his background - his British birth, his strong blood and emotional relationship, shall we say, with Great Britain, and the rest of it - that he got along as well as he did with the Americans. Evidently he did. I can find no sign, shall we say, of any anti-Americanism in Pearkes.

F. No.

R. And he was quite willling to operate whole-heartedly and fully with

certain American personnel in Canada, in advance.

R. I think his greatest problem - I don't know if you would agree with me in this or not - was that he, and indeed Mr. Harkness and indeed the present government as far as that's concerned, was living in an age of such rapid technological advance that for a person in '57 or '58 or '59 to try and make a decision on a weapons system that might cost a quarter, a half a million or a billion dollars in that year for this year that considering the technological pace that it was almost impossible to do so.

F. Well, certainly it was extremely difficult to pretend that you were an expert and were, you know, fully informed and understood all the implications of this enormous development, the age of atomic weapons. It may be that a man of a more philosophical bent of mind than George Pearkes would have had a better balanced view, I don't know, and I think that George showed a surprising readiness and ability to try to keep up and to open his mind to new ideas and to the significance of the new weaponry. Going back to the question and answer which just immediately preceded this one when you said that he showed a surprising readiness to co-operate with the United States, surprising in view of his background, etc. Yes, I agree with that. I think the reason for that co-operation - I answered it in general terms about, you know, the desirability of consultation beforehand rather than after the event and since the main people who had been omitted, you know, the people who were most aloof from any such consultation, were the Americans both prior to 1918 and 1939, it made good sense to embrace every opportunity to establish channels of communication and involvement of the United States beforehand.

the United States. There was no suspicion in his mind - perhaps there was too little suspicion in some ways, I don't know.

F. I suppose the debate could go on endlessly, but one thing I have always accepted as true is that probably the First World War and possibly the Second World War would have, or could have been prevented had the relations who became known as the Allies, discussed their common defence problems and concerted their defence plans in advance and made it known that if this happened this would happen. Now whether that would ever be possible in this world of human beings, I don't know, but if it had happened I think it might well have prevented one or both of those wars. Since it seems very difficult to say that you can wave a magic wand or that we can find the secret that will in fact end war forever - one hopes to God we can - and the urgency of that with atomic weapons becomes more important perhaps than before, I don't think you can ever say with certainty that there will never be another war, and therefore bearing in mind the lesson, if you like, of the non-cooperation and non-consultation that preceded the two major world wars, We were convinced, I'm sure George was convinced - I think it's the right decision - NATO is the same concept - let us discuss what may happen not in order to make it happen in terms of having a war, but that if a war comes in spite of our best efforts to avoid it we will have concerted our plans beforehand, and let any potential enemy know that we are concerting our plans and to that extent discourage him. Now that seems to me an acceptable basis upon which to develop your defence policy, and I think that's the underlying thing behind NORAD and behind NATO and behind the decision to have Bomarc bases and

E. Davie Fulton Interview, May 10, 1972

R. Let me ask you one final question; what would you say were his major failures?

F. Well, in the context we were just discussing, that of the political and governmental part of his career, I suppose that - I would rather not put it as a failure on George Pearkes' part, but I suppose it would be a fair comment to say that to the extent that the issues involved in the acceptance of the Bomarc, the nuclear warheads, all that part of the issue, were not clearly understood, faced and resolved - you know, definitively - much earlier from the very beginning. It may partly be George's responsibility to that extent, to the extent that he is responsible for that - and its not his sole responsibility by any means - but that may be a "failure" if you like, because the fact of the matter is, it developed into a crisis. George was no longer Minister, but again, you see, I go back to my recollection, that the fact that this might even be or become an issue and that this important decision with respect to nuclear warheads was part of the decision to take Bomarcs, etc., maybe we should have been intelligent enough to realize that without being told at the outset, but my recollection is that if we were told it was in such a way that it wasn't clear to us that this had been . . . what was not clear was what the implications of that decision were.

R. And if I remember correctly even at the time of the decision to have a Bomarc, we had the Bomarc A and the Bomarc B, and the Bomarc A, of course, used the normal high explosive and the Bomarc B was the atomic one, and I don't know if you remember it, but there was a period there of several months when one or the other was being shot up and there was failure after failure until they were tinkering

with it and finally they got it to go and off they went and then one struck a target, but there was a lot of . . .

F. Yes, I remember that now. I'm not saying it was George's fault entirely though - in fact I hesitate to use even the word fault let alone entirely or partly - that the implications of the Bomarc thing were not exposed to us in the Cabinet in time, but to the extent that that was a mistake and that George, therefore, must have some responsibility for it, that that might be regarded as a failure, or a mistake - I'll put it that way.

R. Well, it's interesting, interesting. Good, thank you kindly.