Kenyon, Lloyd Everett: my Army recollections (September 12, 1983 - August 27, 1984)
An interview/narrative of Lloyd Everett Kenyon's experiences during World War II. Brigadier-General Kenyon served with the Royal Canadian Artillery and the Directorate of Military Intelligence. Interview took place on September 12, 14, 21, 1983, May 23, 30, June 6, 20, 29, July 3, 6, 13, 16, 18, 23, 27, 31, August 3, 13, 15, 20 and 27, 1984.
Interviewer: Bell, Chris
ABSTRACT: Brigadier-General Lloyd Everett Kenyon Royal Canadian Artillery Directorate of Military Intelligence (Reel 1, Side 1) B-Gen. Kenyon was born on June 9, 1915 in Waterloo, Ontario. Some details of family background. Enroled in the 10th Field Battery, R.C.A. (militia) in 1935. Commissioned during the winter of 1938/39. Describes summer camp, social events, etc. At the outbreak of war the battery became part of the 2nd Field Regiment, R.C.A. Recruiting. Move to Aldershot, England, intensive training began. Attended first Canadian staff college course in January 1941. Posted as Staff Captain, 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade. Feels that some militia officers not efficient and some criticism of senior officers. Appointed to Canadian Corps headquarters. (95:00) (Reel 1, Side 2) Artillery gunnery. Conversations with senior officers. Involved in planning, Mediterranean Theatre. Appointed officer commanding 12th Battery, 7th Army Field Regiment (later designated the 7th Medium Reg't R.C.A.) as a major. In May, 1943 posted to personnel job at Aldershot. Sent to Italy in January, 1944, Corps Headquarters, then to 5th Canadian Armoured Division as Grade II staff officer. Comments on fighting in Italy. Corps moved to Belgium, 1945. Returned to Canada to the directing staff at the army staff college for a year. Explains some of the curriculum. (95:00) (Reel 2, Side 1) Exercises at, and the purpose of, the staff college. Return to comments on the Italian campaign. Organizing the peace-time army. Worked in the Directorate of Military Intelligence. Problem of finding suitable personnel, reliable conscientious types best. Military attache system expanded as a source of intelligence. Was able to obtain the services of one officer for "recruiting", an occupation not authorized in the strictest sense. Intelligence work had to be produced so that it could be "sold"- ie. understood and appreciated by one's superiors, military and political. Intelligence analysis should not speculate, hard facts only. (95:00) (Reel 3, Side 1) General comments and organization of the Directorate of Intelligence. Followed the British system. Reverts to comments on war-time exercise in England, artillery shoot, etc. Intelligence work in Ottawa, post war. Security classifications, military attaches. (90:00) (Reel 3, Side 2) Anecdote regarding French mobilization plans. Some criteria in the choosing of military attaches. Anecdotes, including the period when B/Gen Kenyon was attache in Yugoslavia. Sometimes felt that his intelligence work was ignored, a lack of close contact with Ottawa. (Reel 4, Side 1) Canadians attend British attache conference. Various thoughts on the Chiefs of the General Staff. Canada followed the British tri-service intelligence model. In conjunction with External Affairs, the Canadian Joint Intelligence Board was formed where an interest developed in economic intelligence. Some work problems, including security within the intelligence organization. Much information from British and American sources. (90:00) (Reel 4, Side 2) Kenyon's respect for Col. W.A.B. Anderson, his superior. Points out that it seemed that the British were less open with their intelligence than were the Americans. The former were more prone to seek an advantage. Refers again to security within the Directorate and the occasional difficulty in dealing with it. Caught off base by the outbreak of war in Korea. Importance of regular intelligence briefing of those in high places. (60:00) (Reel 5, Side 1) Donates private library on intelligence to the School of Military Intelligence at Camp Borden. General account of Canadian intelligence work. Trip to Turkey. Career path for officers in the Intelligence section - probably maximum rank, a full colonel. Peacetime intelligence and the importance of keeping current. Kenyon makes decision to keep to the staff side of the military, rather than return to the field. Accepts the position of attache to Yugoslavia (1951). Language course, new clothes, large supply of food. Comments on Pres. Tito and the ethnic mix in the country. (95:00) (Reel 5, Side 2) Some aspects of the political scene in Yugoslavia, including the anti-Stalinist attitude, but not anti-communist Yugoslav military. Military attache interested in order of battle of Yugoslav. army, location of units, equipment, efficiency, etc. Field trips, restricted areas. (75:00) (Reel 6, Side 1) Security matters. Ethnic German population. Joint Intelligence Bureau in London had a large "want" list of pictures of transportation and manufacturing facilities. Eventually visited all of Yugoslavia. Official trips and demonstrations put on by the Yugoslav military. Relations with other military attaches. (95:00) (Reel 6, Side 2) Co-operation between attaches, most frequently took place at parties. War-time divisions within Yugoslavia and some Allied personalities involved. Security problems in Belgrade. Conscription/training in the Yugoslav army. Relationship to the Canadian ambassador. (60.00) (Reel 7, Side 1) Internal security in Yugoslavia very efficient; little contact was possible with the civilian population. Discusses Communism and his personal feelings toward it. Social life. Becomes doyen of the military attaches. Diversity of cultures within the country. Diplomatic and civilian personalities, hunting parties, etc. (95:00) (Reel 7, Side 2) Very formal relations with Yugoslavs, much protocol at official functions. Rarely did wives attend, except those whose husbands were involved in liaison with foreigners. Opportunities to see military manoeuvres. Trieste crisis, 1953. Yugoslav mobilization "practice" felt by Kenyon to be the real thing. Wrote long report of the state of the Yugoslav army in the Trieste area. (95:00) (Reel 8, Side 1) The Yugoslav army and the elite Tito Guards. Indoctrination of the troops and of the general population. Facets of the peasant life, including religion. Alliances and Balkan Pact of 1953/54. Extremely important war industry in Yugoslavia. Visits of foreign heads of state, including Kruschev. Describes a hunting party and an off-the-record briefing including an account of the death of Beria (head of Russian KGB). Visit of students of the Canadian Defence College. (95:00) (Reel 8, Side 2) Had good relations with the Dept. of External Affairs (Canada), although changes in personnel were not always smooth. Travelled to Turkey and Greece. Returns to Canada in 1955. Stationed in Regina (Prairie Command), then chief of staff at Winnipeg. Attends tactical nuclear course in the United States. As a full Colonel participates in a brigade exercise (1958). Comments on Civil Defence. (95:00) (Reel 9, Side 1) Clarification of some points re Yugoslavia. Princess Margaret visits Regina. Unionized workers of the Defence Department. Mess dinners. Guard of Honour problems. Military Survival courses. Appointed to Ottawa. Comments on the importance of planning exercises, simulating attacks and the importance of preparations for response. Rescue School. Army organization in response to nuclear attacks. (95:00) (Reel 9, Side 2) Nuclear war. Requirement for special equipment and supplies. Posted to NATO in Paris and describes the organization and administration. As part of the international staff Kenyon was civil defence advisor. Attempts to promote a civil defence exercise which became lost in the bureaucracy; too many civilian committees. Some accomplishments at NATO. (90:00) (Reel 10, Side 1) Civil Defence matters. Leaves NATO to work at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. Anecdote about cadet camp. Posted to Vietnam, Sept. 1963, to the International Control Commission. Discusses situation in Vietnam, Indian, Polish, and Canadian delegations and their responsibilities, duties and the interaction of the differing nationalities. (95:00) (Reel 10, Side 2) International Control Commission, Hanoi and Saigon. Social and military events. Servants (Chinese). Relations with the press. Transportation, inspections, operations and regulations, outposts, food, official entertaining, etc. Visit to Hanoi. (90:00) (Reel 11, Side 1) Attitudes in North and South Vietnam, restrictions, etc. The Vietnamese mind. Discusses Canadian members of the mission. Quality of postings, North vs. South. A financially attractive post for Canadians. Assessment of the Polish officers. The siting of some of the Commission outposts tended to reduce the effectiveness of their work. Personnel problems, some friction between military and External Affairs staff. (95:00) (Reel 11, Side 2) Some illegal financial/trade practices suspected of Canadians. Military and social customs in effect with the Canadians. Comments on travel, religious practices in the North. Contact with the local government authorities. South Vietnamese liaison staff. Northern propaganda. Often awkward for foreigners to deal with the North Vietnamese. All culture very politically oriented. Attempted to gain some idea of the agricultural and manufacturing progress being achieved in the North. Entertainment in Hanoi, film and opera. (95:00) (Reel 12, Side 1) Regular reports by the Commission were under very restrictive regulation. Obstructive tactics by the Polish members of the Commission, often by simply not participating in an inspection team. Felt that the Indians were not entirely reliable in negotiations. Canadians received "representational allowances" in Vietnam, largely used to pay for social events that were required. Cambodian visit. Comments at some length on religion in South Vietnam, often had a great influence on society. Offers an opinion on the British method of suppressing insurgents - the Malaya example of bringing the civilian population on side. Fortified hamlet system effective but not popular with the peasants. This caused the North Vietnamese to escalate the war. American journalism and news reporting which often had an adverse effect on reliable news. Sometimes details used to justify a preconceived position. Generally the press treated the U.S. rather badly. (95:00) (Reel 12, Side 2) (Poor audio at the beginning). South Vietnamese coup in 1963. Plays tape recording made on the day of the coup, from the roof of the Canadian offices. Situation in Saigon, fighting, civilian, etc. In January 1963 there was another coup, virtually bloodless. Security programmes, relations with the Americans. Contact with the C.I.A., directly when in the field. Some unwritten orders from Canada. Intelligence gathering was sometimes difficult; felt that the Americans did not completely trust the Canadian security. Passed on information to the Americans which had been gathered in Hanoi. Commission began to wind down as the war heated up. Some comment on the American vs. British outlook toward war. (95:00) (Reel 13, Side 1) Discipline and morale sometimes difficult for the Americans, the situation not being helped by the media. Canadian office routine. Vietnamese attitudes, Jesuit missionaries who were usually very helpful with advice. Anecdotes. During one leave, was invited to a tiger hunt in India, mounted by the Poona Horse (an armoured regiment). (90:00) (Reel 13, Side 2) Describes Indian experiences in some details. Hunting in Vietnam. July-August, 1964 in Hong Kong. Return trip to Canada began (with Mrs. Kenyon) with one month in India. (95:00) (Reel 14, Side 1) Comments on French language training in Vietnam. Reported in Ottawa to Planning and Intelligence where he became Director of Intelligence. Discusses administrative channels open to him, access to superiors, etc. Concept and implementation of the integration of the services. Many committee meetings to judge the intelligence implications of integration. Many structural changes necessary throughout the forces, including officer's messes, services, different requirements for skills and levels of training. Feels that the Intelligence service was affected through the removal of personnel appointments from the Director of Intelligence. Too little consultation with those responsible for the efficient running of the directorate. Feels that training lacks input from the "sharp end" of the forces. (95:00) (Reel 14, Side 2) Believes that operational research should be part of the army staff; every tactical problem should be considered as well as specific problems. Problems in Intelligence - attempts by others to over-ride security. Post-integration intelligence organization. The Joint Intelligence Committee downgraded by Kenyon as very time-consuming. Had the feeling that too little use made of intelligence material because of insufficient time allocated for briefing of those in senior positions. Intelligence Directorate had staff of about 140 persons. (90:00) (Reel 15, Side 1) Clarifies a number of points regarding intelligence and integration. Joint (with U.S.) Intelligence Board considered threats to North America. Feels that Personnel Branch created problems by posting "unsuitable" persons to the Directorate. Again mentions difficulty in "selling" information gathered. Canadians lacked intelligence to offer other organizations since we gathered little. Also had some difficulty in evaluation the "soundness" of information that we received. A better balance between gathering, production and selling of information was required. (95:00) (Reel 15, Side 2) Integration re-organization. Required many rehearsals of proposals before presenting to superiors, especially the Chief of Defence Staff. General organizational remarks. Briefing teams, audio-visual presentations. Time is very important to senior people therefore presentation must be smooth, complete, succinct, in order to hold their attention. Emphasizes the need for proper and knowledgeable presentation in order to sell intelligence. Relations with Paul Hellyer, Minister of National Defence. (95:00) (Reel 16, Side 1) Duty to gather intelligence about foreign armed forces. Clear, technical writing important. Committee meetings reduced by the Minister. Commands military funeral of General H.G. Crerar. Comments regarding briefings, encourages staff and others to "think intelligence" and widens participation within the organization. Cabinet briefings and of the Minister of External Affairs. (95:00) (Reel 16, Side 2) Sample briefing to External Affairs. Informal briefings to Paul Hellyer. Interested in instructing military attaches who could be an important source of information. Deplores fact that the School of Military Intelligence was transferred to Training Command. Exchanging information with the Americans. (90:00) (Reel 17, Side 1) Occasionally attended parliamentary debates. Meetings with the Minister of Defence and Chief of Defence Staff. Use of American information. Returns to his time in Belgrade. Satellite intelligence, very heavy security. The importance of correct analysis of satellite information required some additional staff. Cooperates with the Americans in establishing a new direction-finding station. (95:00) (Reel 17, Side 2) Has to justify the existence of the Intelligence Branch. Directorate of Scientific Intelligence and Directorate of Security become part of the Directorate of Military Intelligence. Some difficulty in integrating the three services. The Canadian Military Intelligence Association, its rationale, methods, results. The FLQ crisis and their sympathizers. Feels that the RCMP were treated somewhat badly by the government and the press. Considers early retirement, after 33 years in the Service. Trips of inspection of Canadian, American, and British bases in Germany. (95:00) (Reel 18, Side 1) Security matters. Royal Commission on security (1967). RCMP on university campuses. Commission studied the future of security forces. Kenyon liaised with the RCMP on the position to be taken in respect of the Commission which was to find ways to establish a civilian security force. Presents submission to the Commission. Some personalities involved. Working relations between military intelligence/security and the RCMP. Canadian Military Intelligence Association. The "Crerar Dinners". (95:00) (Reel 18, Side 2) Crerar Dinners continued. Returns to discussion of military attaches, Canadian and foreign. Visiting (Canadian) bases, a source of intelligence. Celebrations on national days, anecdotes. (95:00) (Reel 19, Side 1) Comments on Gen. de Gaulle and the Algiers problem. Travel in India; the Sikhs. Entertainment in Saigon and protocol in general. Parties in Ottawa as Director General of Intelligence. Public employees obtain the right to strike, defining essential services. On leave overseas. Lack of intelligence services within External Affairs. (95:00) (Reel 19, Side 2) Intelligence Conference, U.S.A., Britain, Australia, Canada. Largely concerned with collection of intelligence rather than "production". External Affairs weak on contingency intelligence, the projection of intelligence and the need for it. Gives an example (Israel). Rumours of a kind of C.I.A., promoted by External Affairs, probably to the detriment of military intelligence. Kenyon raised successful objections. Did not like the prospects for the intelligence field, the prospect of civilian input spelled trouble. Made move toward retirement. Briefed new Prime Minister (Trudeau) but feels efforts probably fell upon deaf ears. Succeeded in position by Maj-Gen. Norman Ross. Retirement party, career reflections. (95:00) (Reel 20, Side 1) Returns to comments on the Yugoslav partisans and time spent in Belgrade as military attache. Canadian defence policy in relation to the United States, to modernization of the Forces, to Trudeau's ideas toward NATO, to North American Air Defence, etc. Believes the Defence budget should be allocated differently, with savings. Militia capabilities. Opinion of the Avro Arrow fighter aircraft. Other Canadian defence problems, equipment, policy, intelligence rationale. More emphasis should be placed on intelligence at staff colleges. Critique of book by Major R.S. Eliot, Scarlet to Green. (95:00) (Reel 20, Side 2) Book critique continues. Points out certain errors and omissions, some personalities, etc. The author was formerly a member of the Directorate of Intelligence, under Brig-Gen. Kenyon. (95:00)
Interviewee: Kenyon, Lloyd Everett, b. 1915
Rank: Brigadier-General.
- In Collection:
- 83 sound recordings (MP3)
- 44, 19.75
- 51.5, 10.5
- Twenty original sound tape reels (ca. 60 hours) : 1 7/8 ips, 2 track, mono. ; 39 sound cassette copies : standard, mono. in Special Collections.
- Canadian Military Oral History Collection
- KLE_226
- Special Collections Finding Aid: https://uvic2.coppul.archivematica.org/reginald-herbert-roy-fonds
- October 18, 2010
- Digital sound recording in .wav format at 16 bits and 44 kHz. In .mp3 format at 56 kbps and 24 kHz. Digitized by JF, technical and cataloguing metadata provided by JF and JP. Transferred from audio reel to audio cassette between 1987-1997. Interview migrated to digital format for UVic Special Collections in 2010. Migration metadata by KD and MT.
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- This interview has been posted with the understanding that it may be used for research purposes only. Should the interviewee or their heirs have any objections to this interview being accessible on the Internet, it will be removed promptly. Contact UVic Special Collections for permission if using for other than research purposes: speccoll@uvic.ca
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