Hanson, James I.: my Army recollections (November 13, 2007)

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Rank: Brigadier General. Medals and Honours: Canadian Forces Decoration

ABSTRACT: BGen Jim Hanson Interviewed by: Natasha Taschuk 13 November 2007 MacPherson Library, Victoria, B.C. Name: James "Jim" Hanson Birthday/Place: Ottawa, 15 February, 1938. When joined the military and why: Father in Canadian Officer Training Corps, but parents not in military. Hanson joined militia 1961 in Kingston, Princess of Wales own Regiment, then 1962, into regular forces, Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. Joined b/c lots of WWII vets kicking around, and every young man wondered if he could've hacked it. Also, was a young man working in a civilian job, and needed the money. Where stationed with 4 CMBG: (2:10) Aug. 1965-Aug. 1969, in Soest, in Ft. Chamblee; 1974-1976, Lahr. With infantry. Rank when retired/when retired: Brigadier-General, Aug. 1991. Kinds of weapons with 4 CMBG: (3:50) In 1952-53, the government bought a whole fleet of vehicles for the Army, and when I got the Germany in 1965, all of the military vehicles had been purchased in 1952-53, so they were getting pretty old. They were still there when I left in 1976. They were just talking about replacing the ton truck in '76, I think it was replaced about a year later, and the% ton truck was replaced about a year after that in 1978. We had the F-N rifles which were manufactured in Canada to a Belgian design in the early 1950s, and we used then up until about the time I retired (4:35). The machine guns were M-1919 Brownings which had originally been 30 caliber, they were re-chambered for 762 Browning M-2 50 caliber machine guns, which they still use. The standard artillery pieces were towed 105 mm howitzer and towed 155 mm howitzer. We got self-propelled howitzers in 1968 in Germany, the M-109, still using it, I'm sure. The M-113 A-1 family of Armored Personnel Carriers first were introduced in Germany in 1964, but were not in general use until '65, because everybody had to be retrained. (5:20) The Centurion tank was a 1952 vehicle. I think when we bought them it had a 20 pounder gun on it and it was eventually upgraded to a 105 mm, and they were still using them when I left in 1976. We got the loan Leopards in 1976, and they were replaced by the Canadian Leopards in 1978. Old tanks. But the Centurion was almost un-maintainable by the time we got rid of it. Nobody else had them. And we had the Dutch rebuilding them, we rebuilt them in Canada, the Canadian ones were rebuilt in Montreal. And the Leopards were a good tank at the time. Obsolete now, but a good tank. Training provided: Everybody that went to Germany was trained to a fairly high standard (6:40) before they ever left Canada, with the idea that you didn't get to Germany unless you had been trained in either your trade or your craft. And they eventually started bringing in younger soldiers, but they were trained in all the basic weapons systems before they ever got to Germany. Germany was fed by the training system and by regular force units back in Canada to ensure that it was always up to a standard we would need to have if we ever had to go to war, which we suspected we might (7:10). Up North, the whole brigade would go out to a place called Sennelager, which was a range camp, and you did small unit tactics, and fired all your basic weapons systems, you'd do that for 3 and 4 weeks. In the autumn, we'd go to a place called the Saltau, up near Luneburg, and we'd do larger field scale exercises, combat arms, coat of range camps, more extensive, the armored corps and the artillery went up to Trown and Bergehonen, and we would provide maintenance for them at the time. And usually in autumn, the brigade would go out on a British divisional exercise (7:55), in the 4 years I was there, we did 3 of them, and pretty wild. The entire division would be out on the road, moving all over Germany, it was really very good practice. And the British always thought we were strange, because we would always go into the woods to hide, they would go into villages. After a while, we said, hey, this makes sense, because if the bad guys had air superiority, it would be harder for them to find you in a village, because you can get your stuff in barns, than it would, they just fly over a patch of woods at night, and they knew that was where you were. So we eventually started doing more and more village deployments. (8:30) The people got paid. Of course, up North the British treated the Germans as a conquered people, and what you had to do is months you went on exercise, you had to go up through the British chain of command and say we want to do an exercise in this area, and then they had to get the land liaison officers to go out to Germans and go to the villages, talk with the mayors, and arrange it all. And there would be also areas where they didn't want you to go, you know, like water catchment areas and places like that, so they'd be marked on your map. . Honest Johns/who in control/safety devices: (9:25) They had nuclear ammunition supply points, and when we were up North, it was not too far from where the Honest John battery was stationed. And there was an American artillery detachment, and it was a two-keyed operation, that you couldn't collect the nuclear weapons without the Americans agreeing to it. They would go up their chain of command for release, and we would go up ours, through NATO for our release, and interestingly enough, up North there was the 69th US Army and Artillery detachment, the young captain had a key to the nuclear weapons. They were basically living in the same garrison as the Honest John Battery (10:05) Fluctuations in emphasis upon conventional vs. nuclear: (10:45) From our viewpoint, it was all the same. You trained to the worst case scenario, which was tactical nuclear weapons, and the tactics were appropriate for a battle which didn't include nuclear weapons, but could escalate to nuclear weapons. There was a dramatic change in the government's policy about 1969. Mr. Trudeau decided that we didn't need to be in Germany, and he sent a parliamentary delegation over in the Spring1969, when the brigade was still up North. And we were told rumors that Trudeau had told them to come back and report that the brigade and the air division should come back home. And they visited 4 Brigade in the field, and Brigadier General Jim Gardner then was the commander, and he briefed them on what we were doing, and they were briefed by the British, and they came away . with the conclusion that not only were we doing an excellent job for Canada but that we should be reinforced and not brought home. And they took that message back to Mr. Trudeau, and Mr. Trudeau decided to cut us in to and move us down South (11:50). But General Gardner was a very eloquent man, a World War Two veteran, escaped three or four times from the Italians and the Germans in Italy, and knew what he was talking about. And our brigade was probably • about as good as some of the British divisions, half the size but as good as. And that's the message they got. Weapons 4 CMBG vs. weapons other NATO members: (12:20) Up North, our artillery pieces by and large and tanks were the same as the British, so they were as good as, or in some cases as vulnerable as, the British. The British had Armored Personnel Carriers, the FV-430 family, which were made of steel and gasoline engines, whereas we had the M113-A1 which was aluminum and diesel about the same time, so we had two different chains of spare parts, actually three. One back to the British, one back to the Canada, and one to the United States. There was a problem with the M113-A1 because the Vietnam War was on, and of course priority for spare parts went to the people in Vietnam, and second priority went to the Americans in Germany and then us. Of course the Canadian military vehicles were built in 1952 (13:08) and spare parts were always a problem. We used to . send the broken stuff back to Canada and it would be repaired usually by city contract, and then it would come back. And the British stuff we got on the British supply system. There was a Canadian detachment of the British supply depot just outside Antwerp, but we always had a Canadian officer there, who shepherded all the Canadian stuff through. It was a little more complicated down South because we were sort of attached to the Americans, but if we went to war, nobody was really sure if we were going to be part of71 US corps or 2"d German corps, and the Germans of course had Leopards, and Americans had M-60s and eventually went to Abrams. M-109s were not a problem, everybody had them, M11381s were not a big problem, everybody had them. But there were questions about some of this special stuff, you know, Canadian only stuff. And there were big questions about what happened if a Canadian got wounded (14:35), where would he go? The Canadians would hand him over to the Americans or the Germans, he could end up in a hospital back in Denver, Colorado. And how could we keep track of these guys. Up North it was much easier, because we were part of the British system and it was almost like WWII, they would wind up back in the UK. Leopard compared to Centurion: (15:10) Much more agile tank, smaller, lighter. I think the Centurion fully loaded was somewhere in the neighborhood of 56 tons, the Leopard was somewhere under 46 tons. The Leopard used diesel and everything eventually was going diesel in NATO. In the Centurion tank, you've got 3 gallons of gas to go a mile, the Leopard, you could go 3 miles on a gallon of diesel, so your petrol/oil lubricant ratio was 9:1. It was 9 times cheaper to run the Leopards in terms of POL. To do an engine change on a Centurion, you were looking at something like 36 man hours. It was usually a 2-man crew that went in to do it, so they were probably out there for 1.5 to 2.5 days, and you needed a recovery vehicle with a big crane to lift the engine out. With the Leopard, I've seen the whole power pack changed in 30 minutes flat. Slid out on rails and a new one dropped in and slid in. You could do it right on the field. The Centurion was done on the field too, just a lot longer. The engine was underneath the auxiliary generator and saddle tanks and everything had to come out to get the engine. And it was a very complicated engine too, it was a Rolls-Royce Meteor, it was an aircraft engine, basically, a V-12 with 24 spark plugs, 2 per cylinder, because it was designed for an aircraft so you didn't want a cylinder to fail so you had a redundant system. And it sort of slid in and slid out. A real buggers­ muddle to change the engine in a Centurion. My guys got pretty good, I had a platoon that did that for a year, they got pretty good at it (16:50). When we first got the M-113, they said, Holy Mackerel is it ever easy to do the M-113. And of course when I was in the South of Germany the Germans showed us the Leopard change and we just couldn't believe it because we were still using the Centurions. Better fire control system too, in the Leopard, I think. Because they bought a computerized, digitalized fire control system when we bought the new Leopards; SABCA, made by the Belgians. Centurion was state of the art in its day, but the Leopard was better. Replacement 1976 far too late: T/F: Well, we were still maintaining the Centurions. Fortunately, when I got to Germany in '74, the Dutch still had some Centurions, and we could get our Centurions rebuilt by the Dutch, at some cost of course. Up North, the British were still driving Centurions so the British workshop in Germany did their Centurions and our Centurions, and we had a little Canadian detachment in their workshop. We did the same with the Dutch, we had a Canadian civilian, ex-military guy, who looked after our tanks going through the tankworkplatz , it was called in Holland. And the Dutch were eventually going to go to Leopard so it was really going to be an orphan tank, so it was just in time. Militarily, if it hadn't been for Trudeau being pressured by the German chancellor, we may not have changed them, we might have gotten out of the tank business. (18:45) The Dutch and British were using Centurions, they were changing to a new British tank, the Dutch of course went to Leopard, the Belgians went to Leopard, the Americans had the M-60 not a bad tank but even bigger than the Centurion, and probably easier to maintain... Any other improvements: (19:55) The introduction of the M113-Al in 1965 gave us better mobility on the battlefield. The introduction of the M-109 was much better for the artillery in terms of mobility, much more difficult to maintain than a truck with a towed gun, but it made us all155mm guns. With the towed guns we were mostly lOSs with 1 battery of 155. When we went to M-109, they were all155 guns and good fire control systems, good accuracy. Serviceability of weapons systems: (21:00) We aimed for 90%, we aimed to have no higher than 10% VOR. And because we were the Canadian military priority for parts and mechanics, if we were held up for something it would be for a part that you couldn't find somewhere in the system. But we had limitations on the amount we could drive our vehicles every year as well. For example, I think for the M-113-Al family we were supposed to put no more than 1500 miles a year on them, if that. And ditto for tanks, so if we went on a big exercise, the vehicles, the tanks and the M-113s would be railed up there on rain cars so as to not use up the track mileage, because the more often you use them the more often they break down (21:50). And you could see in the Autumn we'd get new army graduates, they'd be posted in, and if they hadn't spent a lot of time driving tanks, you'd start getting things like gear boxes and final drives broken for the first two or three weeks of a big the exercise. And by the end of the exercise, we'd replace them all and then the guys were good and they could run for the next year without breaking too many final drives and gear boxes. Aging process of weapons: (22:25) The trucks, we bought them in 1952, and we didn't replace the jeeps until about 1976-77. The % tons about the same time. The 2.5 ton trucks we didn't replace until I think in the early '80s and the Canadian 5 ton truck replacement program was signed to replace them in I think, 1988. So in 1988, we were still driving 5 ton trucks made in 1952. And the M109s of course, we bought them off the shelf from the Americans in '68, and we were still driving them when we came home from Germany. But a lot of people were using them so you could get them repaired and get spare parts through the American or German systems. And there was something called the Leopard User Nations Committee, we called it the Leopard club, and all the Leopard user nations were members of it and we got together to buy spare parts and stuff in bulk from the manufacturers and save money. The Germans are very conscientious of that, they ran the club. Supplies: (24:50) Depending on where we were. Up North, we were buttoned onto the British supply chain and the Medical supply chain. And it was quite simple, because we were attached to the British Army, so we had Canadians all the way back through their supply system to try to keep an eye on our stuff coming forward. When we moved South, I don't think anybody paid a whole lot of attention to how we'd get stuff. And when I got there in '74, we'd been down South for 4 years and they still hadn't gotten all of the wrinkles out of the system. And partly because Germans said if we were attached permanently to Germany they'd be happy to give us everything, the Americans the same. But since we were sort of in the crack between the two of them, they were not really terrible interested. (26:00)We got loan Leopards for the first two years and then we decided we would buy the German Leopard but we wanted the Belgian SABCA fire control system, so we had a unique tank. The Belgians had the same sort of tank but they were way up North. And we would get them rebuilt in Germany. The Germans had a big tank detachment in Camp Shiloh in Manitoba, and we would rebuild their Leopards in the workshop Montreal where we rebuilt our own Leopards. And we had a deal, we'll rebuild two of your tanks in Canada, you rebuild two of our tanks in Germany. Eventually it got to the point that they owed us, because we had so many fewer tanks that they were rebuilding. Role of Canada in defense of Europe: (27:30) Up North, we were basically in the front lines. When the balloon went up we knew exactly where we were to go, and it was a chunk of the line held by the British. And a very key part of the defensive battle. So we had a piece of real estate with our brigade up north which was about 6000 strong, which would probably almost be the equivalent as a British division would hold, which would be about a 2 brigade or 3 brigade division. When we moved down South, of course, the Brigade was cut in two, it was only about 3000 strong. Instead of something like 60 Centurion tanks we had maybe 30 Leopards, and we lost a couple batteries of guns, we lost a whole battalion of infantry, from about 1000 people down to about 600. We might have gone with the Americans and we might have gone with the Germans, and that decision would have been probably made when the war started, so it was kind of awkward. We knew where we were supposed to go, and it was sort of in the gap between 7th US corps and 2nd German corps (28:45). But there was a lot more question marks in my view down South than there were up North. Canada's presence was essential: T/F: (29:40) Oh yeah. Both in real terms, especially up North, I mean, we were a big piece of the action. British Army of the Rhine were three divisions and us. And there was a Belgian corps, and of course all kinds of Germans and there was a Dutch division. We were almost the equivalent of a British division. So it was important for the defense of Germany, of course our capability because we were a professional army, you know, no draftees. Whereas everybody else except the Brits had a draftee army. Down South, the Americans still had a draftee army when we got there, they had just done away with the draft, the last draftees were just about to go home, but the Belgians and the Germans and the French were all a draftee army, so we were considered very capable in terms of professional. And I think the NATO allies thought we were important to have a Canadian presence on the ground because it was a North American presence. While we were there, Canada was going to be involved in the defense of Western Europe, and we were going to pay for it in blood. (31:20) But I don't think we were every bit as committed down South as we were up North, partly because Mr. Trudeau was not in favor of any of that stuff, and it was difficult to do and it was expensive. The Move South: (32:40) The move South was done so quickly that a lot of things just didn't get done. And the in-depth planning that was done up North and had been practiced for years in exercises just didn't get done down South for a while. Action 4 CMBG prepared to take: (33:05) Both up North and down South they had what was called a GDP, or General Deployment Plan, which was where you, you know all the American troops and the British troops would go. Well the Canadians had their own GDP area, up North, I think it was on the Weser River, I think I recce'd it in '68-'69. Down South, I'm not sure where it would be, because it would be up to either the Americans or the Germans to put us in the line once we were cut to one of the two, after we went to our GDP, or reserve area, which was sort of between the two corps. Close calls: (33:55) There was a lot of nervousness in 1968 at the time of the Prague spring, and it was a big surprise. At the time there was a lot of nervousness, and then it sort of died down. [me: and you were in Soest at that time?] I was. If memory serves rightly, we were just about to go on our fall exercises. Ideological education by Canadian govn't: (36:10) Don't recall any. We knew a fair bit about Soviet ORBAT, you know, the order of battle, but I don't recall ever discussing the politics of the Soviet Union, and certainly not within the military sphere. Integration within the German community: (37:45) They were always glad to see us. Up North and down South. We had a number of Canadians of Gennan ancestry who spoke the language, and we also had soldiers who had married German girls, who would be back in Germany on their second or third tours who had mastered enough of the language because the wives would speak it to kids in the home. And of course, we spent money. You went on exercise, you didn't like what was in the rations, you went to go a gas stop- I ate a lot of schnitzel [laughing]. Comments on leave: (38:45) There wasn't a number. And it was restricted and very carefully controlled. And when you had a big exercise coming up, everybody had to be on deck. It was very difficult, there was a policy certainly up North, that you didn't go home on a career course, which was one of the reasons they wanted anybody that came to Germany to have all of the courses he or she required before they got there. Trudeau brings military closer to home; comments: (40:30) Partly because we were seen as a good military contribution. Partly because the politics of having us on the ground was useful. They thought if Canadians go home, maybe the Americans will start to thin out. And there was always an attitude behind the scenes, never expressed to us, but certainly at NATO headquarters, that Canada was trying to do it on the cheap. le; that Canada wanted all the glory, but they didn't want to put their money where their mouth was, especially down in the South. I never heard it up North, you know, the Brits valued what we were doing. But we were always saying we could do more if we had more. Everybody was thin on the ground considering the strength of the Soviet forces in Germany. There was a wonderful cartoon, it showed this poor little mouse, and this huge eagle swooping down on him, and the mouse had his hand behind his back and he was giving the eagle the finger, and written across the eagle was "USSR" and the mouse was labeled "NATO," and this was labeled "the last gesture of defiance." [laughing]. I think we would've held our own, but they just had so much man strength. (42:15) I know we were valued certainly by the British and by the NATO higher ups in the military chain of command. (42:40) But Trudeau had never served in the military, at least not overseas. Cold War no longer hot: (43:15) Certainly that wasn't the case when I was there. I went from 4 brigade in 1976 I went back to teach at the army staff college in Kingston, so I visited the brigade twice a year with the staff college, so I was there right up to '79, and we were still very much twitchy about the Soviets. And I had a funny job in '81-'82 that got me over to NATO headquarters, and it was still very much a big question mark, you know, how dangerous are these guys, and the word we were getting from the intelligence guys was there was no diminution in the size of the Soviet forces in Germany. I guess the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan showed us that they were still capable of moving into another country. I guess when the wall came down, that was the first indication that things were going to change (44:23). But I don't think that the Cold War really ended until Gorbachev disappeared and Yeltsin took over in '91. Any background to Soviet history: (44:55) No, I read a fair bit about it, and I took two correspondence courses while I was there...that was about it. Education by the Canadian military: Most significant changes with 4 CMBG: (46:30) Up North, we thought we were probably under strength, but we were much better looked after and we were much more combat effective because we were much bigger, than we were after we moved down South. And I think governments up until 1970. realized that we were a valuable diplomatic resource, and certainly we were told that we were a valuable military resource. When we moved down South we were probably less important diplomatically because we didn't have complete support from the Germans or the Americans because they didn't know if they were going to own us (47:00). And certainly we didn't have the backup on the supply system because it was much more difficult to arrange down South. So in terms of combat effectiveness, pound for pound, I think the soldiers were just about as good as they were up North, but there were so many less of us, and the stuff was getting older and older now too. The trucks were now 24 years old, and so were the tanks. [NT: so you definitely noticed, corresponding with the Trudeau government and the move to the South, a decrease in government support?] (47:45) yeah, I didn't realize just how bad it was until long afterward, when I got out. Trends in govn't support: (49:00) Talked a great game, the question is did they put the money where their mouth is? You'd think up North, for example, the transport company that brought the supplies up to the brigade, what we call combat supplies, which was ammunition, ration, petrol, and lubricants; we had 80 trucks with at least two drivers per truck so you could run them all the time. Down South, we had 40 trucks with one driver per truck, so if a guy got sick, that truck didn't move. And up North, you know, not only did we have 80 trucks but there were back up trucks available, down South, the backup trucks weren't there at all. (49:45) On the combat arms side, we went from a tank regiment from 80 Centurion family vehicles most of which had guns on them, to instead of three big squadrons of 20 tanks each, we went to two little squadrons with very little backup. I think the message was cut 'em I half, 6000 down to 3000, and then see what they can do with what they got left. And so right away, you try to make fewer guys do more jobs (50:25). And so if it's going to be two guys in a truck and one less guy in a tank, then it's going to be one guy in the truck so that extra guy can go in the tank. Which makes real sense for the day one of the war, but day four when there's nobody left to drive the trucks with the supplies in them, it doesn't work anymore. [me: government's motivation?] (51:05) More money on social spending. Then of course, deficient funding and everything else that happened during the Trudeau era. Changes in perception: (53:00) If anybody was thinking that things were relaxing, the Prague Spring of 1968 put an end to that, that these guys are still out there and they're still dangerous. Specific Duties: (53:50) When I was up North, I went in 1965 as a Lieutenant, and I was a platoon commander, I had a platoon that fixed the wheeled trucks, initially about 40 guys. Then in '66, I moved over to run what they called the Forward Repair Platoon which was about 45 guys and they went out to repair tanks and Armored Personnel Carriers where they broke down. If a truck broke down, it would be brought back to the workshop where it could be fixed under cover...Then I took over as the administrative officer of the workshop, I was a captain, and I was the guy that pushed all the paperwork. And my last year in the workshop, I was still a captain, and I became in charge of the recovery officer as well as the training officer. ...Then in '68 they created the Service Battalion and I was posted into the battalion headquarters as what they called logistics operations officer, you know, writing up standard operating procedures. (55:30) My second tour in Germany I was the commanding officer of the service battalion, so I just sat around and watched the guys work [laughing].

Interviewee: Hanson, James I., b. 1938

An interview/narrative of Jim Hanson's experiences during the Cold War. Brigadier General Hanson served with 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. Interview took place on November 13, 2007.

Interviewer: Taschuk, Natasha

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Contributor Subject Language Keyword Date created Relation
  • Part of the Military Oral History Class collection of interviews.
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  • November 13, 2007
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