Summers, Ken: my armed forces recollections (November 12, 2008)
Interviewee: Summers, Ken
Rank: Rear Admiral.
Interviewer: Disher, Courtney
ABSTRACT: Ken Summers Summers_K_0572_01.mp3 3:00min "The best response in actual fact was sending the naval task group ... by sending the navy, it takes them a while to get there, and that allowed the whole situation to play out in the month of August and first half of September to really see what was happening. " The mission at the time was very general "All we knew when we left was that we were going to be going over to join with other nations in this coalition of the willing to look at an embargo put in place in the Gulf area." Threat was clearly known Tried to equip themselves as best they could for the mission upgrades/ technology It was not clear Right up until January 15 there were still negotiations going on - still unclear Thought that there would be a diplomatic solution Even unsure of where they were going Initially a naval task force Had meetings about what countries had which strengths It soon became advisable for the F 18s to come over and provide safety for the navy The mission evolved several times "There was nothing in my training that prepared me for that particular role, but yet everything that I had done to that date prepared me for that. Nothing and everything .., 12:30min The fact that you are going over there puts you in harm's way Believe they had sufficient training In the sweep and escort mission, our planes were above the triple A fire It was well known that Saddam wanted control of the Holy Mosques Canadian citizens in the Gulf area that could be harmed -living there Encouraged families to get out or get proper protection 17:15min Very proud of the role Canada was taking in this event - working with other nations and the UN Thinks we did the responsible thing 19:00min Had meetings about which countries had which strenb'!hs - were sent to different places depending on their strengths - what you could and could not do was put on the table - and how were they going to integrate these forces Almost all the European countries took the southern Gulf - patrolling The only people in the central Gulf were the US navy Canada in the central and northern Gulf - factors for that "We had worked so closely with the Americans over the years on both coasts, we used the same type of command and control systems, so the exchange 0f information was very timely and quickly, and we were very comfortable, so we would know the entire picture." Our ships became very proficient in the anti-air warfare Had no concerns about the ships being able to look after themselves in they were in fact attacked from the air, if they knew what was coming Our sensors weren't as good at the US systems, but they were still good Initially the FI8s were only patrolling the Gulf "The Fl8 pilots at the time became really comfortable operating with the United States Navy over the Gulf." 37:00min He was responsible for all of the negotiations with the Allied leaders Was on top of all the operations going on Was delegated this command because the Chief of Defense Staff wanted one person to tell him everything Supporting role in Ottawa - giving all power over to the commanders in the Gulf Was informally given the task - if the CDS was unavailable, he had the authority to do what he thought was right at the present time, and they would sort things out later Probably about 400-500 women over in the Gulf 54:30min The ships we had were grossly inadequate Equipment and training wise, standards were met - were fairly high. and helped out the Americans to a large extent The navy was not prepared, but this was a surface war not a sea war The Fl8s were better off than the navy, but still needed improvements on their communication systems Sharing equipment with other countries - going out heavier than when they came FI8s only dropped DUMB bombs - weren't at war long enough to drop SMART bombs - lasering The field hospital was not prepared "Were we prepared? No, we weren't prepared, but were we able to get ourselves prepared? Yes." Morale was sky high Some apprehension, but people wanted to go Generally speaking morale was extremely high Media sometimes would mislead the public to think otherwise, sometimes from only one soldier statement 1h 15:30min He thought there would be negotiations All you can do is be prepared for anything - missions change constantly Went to great lengths to train forces He would not ask them to do anything that they were not prepared for 1h21 :30min When Saddam began using the SCUD's - DUMB missile 1h26:30min Weren't aware of this It is evident now - different people reacted in different ways The commander of the Iraqi forces - at eh ceasefire - had been authorized by Saddam to use biological weapons but refused to order his troops to arm the weapons - thought it was a bridge too far Was in the know of everything that was going on - not everyone else knew the whole picture Didn't know about it at the time 1h33:30min Prevented any reconnaissance coming in Respiratory - long term impact Oil burning on the group. seeping into the sand Oil into the water 1h39:15min Afghanistan - lessons learned - would not drop DUMB bombs - only SMART technology Absolutely 1h43:00min The action in Rwanda - they were there as peacekeepers -lightly armed and ill-equipped - also strict rules enforces on what peacekeepers could do No intention of going into Iraq - Kuwait only No strategic input to do with oil Different resolutions from the UN Rules were different There is now backing by the international community to go in to a country to stop genocide 1h47:45min Canadians - peacekeeping ended a long time ago Were not in their peace keeping - trying to make peace More and more recognition that they are veterans
An interview/narrative of Rear Admiral Ken Summers's experiences during the Gulf War. Interview took place on November 12, 2008.
- In Collection:
- United States--Navy
- Persian Gulf War, 1991--Medical care
- Fighter plane combat
- Persian Gulf War, 1991--Personal narratives, Canadian
- Iraq-Kuwait Crisis, 1990-1991
- Canada--Canadian Armed Forces--Communication systems
- Peacekeeping forces, Canadian
- Canada--Canadian Armed Forces--Operational readiness
- Canada--Canadian Armed Forces--Personal narratives
- United Nations--Peacekeeping forces
- United States--Air Force
- Canada--Canadian Armed Forces--Equipment
- Canada--Canadian Armed Forces--Middle East
- Psychology, Military
- Precision guided munitions
- Canada--Canadian Armed Forces--Canadian Naval Task Group
- Persian Gulf War, 1991
- Canada--Canadian Armed Forces--Finance
- Persian Gulf
- Surface-to-air missiles
- Canada--Canadian Armed Forces--Blockades
- Scud missile
- Operation Desert Shield, 1990-1991
- United Nations--Armed forces
- Persian Gulf War, 1991--Naval operations, Canadian
- Hussein, Saddam, 1937-2006
- Persian Gulf War, 1991--Canadian Naval Task Group
- Post-traumatic stress disorder
- Canada--Canadian Armed Forces--Maritime Command
- Persian Gulf War, 1991--Blockades
- Summers, Kenneth James, 1944- --Interviews
- Canada--Dept. of National Defence--Headquarters
- Persian Gulf syndrome
- Rwanda--History--Civil War, 1994
- Antiairborne warfare
- Hornet (Jet fighter plane)
- Transportation, Military
- Military morale
- Canada--Royal Canadian Navy
- Biological weapons
- Canada--Canadian Armed Forces--Organization
- Persian Gulf War, 1991--Logistics
- Canada--Royal Canadian Air Force
- Canada--Canadian Armed Forces--Women
- Canada--Canadian Armed Forces--Second Canadian Destroyer Squadron
- 1 sound recording (MP3)
- 39.76, -98.5
- 60.10867, -113.64258
- Original sound recording (MP3) also available.
- Canadian Military Oral History Collection
- SK_572
- Special Collections Finding Aid: https://uvic2.coppul.archivematica.org/military-oral-history-collection
- October 6, 2009
- Digital sound recording in .mp3 format at 56 kbps and 24 kHz. Digitized by JF, technical and cataloguing metadata provided by JF and JP. Interview recorded in digital format for UVic Special Collections in 2009. Migration metadata by KD and MT.
- Rights
- This interview has been posted with the understanding that it may be used for research purposes only. Should the interviewee or their heirs have any objections to this interview being accessible on the Internet, it will be removed promptly. Contact UVic Special Collections for permission if using for other than research purposes: speccoll@uvic.ca
- DOI
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