Olson, George: my Army recollections (November 21, 2007)

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Rank: Colonel. Medals and Honours: Canadian Forces Decoration

Interviewer: Taschuk, Natasha

Interviewee: Olson, George, b. 1931

An interview/narrative of George Olson's experiences during the Cold War. Colonel Olson served with 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. Interview took place on November 21, 2007.

ABSTRACT: Col. George OlsonInterviewed by: Natasha Taschuk21 November 2007MacPherson, Victoria, B.C.Name: George OlsonBirthday/Place: Antiox, BC (North of Prince Rupert), 27 February 193 L Neither of parents in military.When joined the military and why: 1951 into Army. Joined because of Korea. I was in senior matric in high school and some of my friends joined, and then I joined. And I was selected to go to officer candidate school in Camp Borden.Where stationed with 4 CMBG: CIBG, 1955-1957 in Hemer. Then next posting with 1 SSM from 1969-1970, and then posted to HQ CFE from '70-'73, and then NDHQ from '73 -'76.Rank when retired/when retired: 1980, and started working for NATO in 1979.Kinds of weapons with 4 CMBG: (4:00) The regiment had 25 pounders and that's about all. Went back to the Second World War. The first brigade that was deployed with NORTHAG, Canadian Brigade, they had the M109, but then when they moved to the Hemer/Soest area they went back to the 25 pounder, because at that time with the British Army of the Rhine it was a matter of logistics, they had lots of 25 pounder rounds. And so we were the last actual regiment to use the 25 pounder...the size of the brigade was about 6000, and that was more or less like a small division. I mean, they had a lot of fire power, a lot of flexibility, a lot of weapons. [NT: and how did the move down South change things?] Well, everything was reduced in size, so it was really just sort of a normal brigade, and of course, they had the SSM 2. • So when they moved South, it was a mechanized brigade. One of the battalions became what they call a mechanized commando, so they were highly mobile, and then the artillery regiment got the self-propelled gun [the howitzer].Honest Johns/control safety devices: [Canada had access to Honest Johns until 1970]. We had Honest John warheads, which are training warheads and launchers, with both 1 and 2 SSM, but we didn't get nuclear support until 1964, although 1 SSM was first in Germany in 1961. But they had a lot of training up to do between the time they first moved into Germany and the first surety inspection, which was in 1964. From 1964-1970, we had full nuclear support. Although every year you had to be recertified (7:15). It was the only army unit in the Canadian forces that was really tested by another country. And while we were with the 4 Brigade and we were a brigade unit in terms of targeting and operational control, we came under 1 British Corps, and I think it was the 2nd Division. If we had deployed to our GDP positions, we would've deployed with the brigade, but the targets that were selected for us if we ever went to fire rockets, that was under the control of the division, because they selected the targets. (8:30) We never had a nuke, our designated weapons were in special storage very near Hemer; those weapons were controlled by the special ammunition command in Heidelberg, SASCOM, and the only time when we would get release of those weapons was in fact if we deployed because there was going to be a war. But we always deployed with our training warheads, which were just a flash smoke weapon. We had to fire those under supervision every year at a special firing camp which was run by the corps. They set up a deployment for us, very much like it would've been if we had deployed to go to war. It was known was an Army training test, now the requirements of that test were set by United States Army Europe and the 514th missile group. So we had to pass an army training test every year so they were comfortable that we could deploy somewhere and put a rocket on a launcher and fire it accurately. (10:30) Because that always involved firing, and part of that exercise was a readiness exercise...all the units in Germany had readiness exercises. Like we had brigade readiness exercises, where, in the middle of the night they call up everybody, and they had a system of contacting, either by telephone or by knocking on people's doors, and you got back to your unit lines and you got into your vehicle and you deployed out to an area, ready to move forward. But we also had a special one run by corps for us, and that was much more stringent, because we had to simulate moving out of unit lines with all our vehicles, and launchers and we . would move to an area and simulate picking up our nuclear weapons, being released, then we would move to a hide area, where we were in the boon-docks. We would set up a no-loan zone, which he cordoned off an area and the weapons would be inside. There would be an area between and outer and an inner area, and that had to be constantly patrolled (12:00), and part of our team was a platoon from one of the infantry battalions and they deployed with us and gave us protection. So that was that sort of exercise, so we were probably tested in more ways than any other Canadian army unit. And in all cases, if we had failed a corps readiness test, or the army training test, we would've been in deep trouble. In fact, one CO had a launcher fall off or had a rocket fall off a launcher, and it wasn't really anybody's fault, it was investigated and it was just one of those things, it had nothing to do with...But he still had a year to go, but he refused to take his unit out and fire another weapon. He was scared. And on the nuclear surety side of it, it was probably even more gut-wrenching, because if you failed, if you got a major deficiency, nuclear support would've been taken away from us (13:35). The first one was done in 1964 which gave us nuclear weapons, and there was an open telephone line between the regimental area in Hemer and the Prime Minister's office because it was so important. I think one other Commanding Officer had on an NSI inspection, had a deficiency, which they couldn't make up their mind whether it was just a minor deficiency or a major one, and they suspended the test for 48 hours, and the powers that be in 514 missile group, the U.S. body we really belonged to, they decided it was a minor [deficiency]. [NT: what was the protocol for if the balloon went up, and were there any rehearsals?] (15:05) We would of course get all our vehicles together and our infantry support, and would've gone down to the special ammunitions site, we would've loaded our weapons onto a vehicle, and off we would've gone. Two, there would be concentration areas where all of the forces of 4 CMBG would've just poured into these various, and then we would deploy to our positions along the Weser. [NT: How were the weapons transported?] (15:50) We had all the warheads would've been on a state truck. But we had 4launchers, actually was reduced to 2 by the time I ended up putting the thing to bed, but those 4 launchers would have the rocket body on it. And we would also carry extra rocket bodies. One thing I maybe should cover is what happened during a nuclear surety inspection. (16:30) You had to simulate all of the things, but you had to go down to the special ammunitions site, and what you would've simulated loading, we called a "black." It simulated exactly what a nuclear warhead was like, but of course it didn't have the explosives in there. And that had to be taken and put on the truck and then the truck had to be escorted to the unit lines. And that simulated all of the weapons. But anyway, when the truck arrived on unit lines, the inspectors would check the truck (17:25). They'd check the truck, they'd check everything. They'd check the springs, the tires, the tire pressure, tire tread...they would check all the little hoses and things in the vehicles...they'd check the engine, they'd check the fan belts. If they found a fan belt with a little nick in it or something, that could've been a major deficiency. The important thing was that the equipment had to be absolutely up to snuff, because you couldn't afford stalling a vehicle or a vehicle carrying a nuclear warhead. Everything had to be checked. And then our launcher vehicles had to be checked, and the launchers themselves had to be checked. But the most important part of it was the black. The black was in a special box, you had to unpack that black and then you had to go through the process of arming the weapon and then mating it with the launcher, loading the warhead on a launcher, and then reversing the whole order. We had to do it by checklist. There were many things that were required (19:00), and it was one of the most frightful things for our technicians, because if somebody dropped a wrench, and it wouldn't have done any damage, of course, because I think it said you could drop that thing from 100 feet and it wouldn't do anything, but anyway, this was just part of the test. (19:30) So they had to be especially careful when they were undoing bolts and things to make sure there was contact with the metal. And then you had to go through the process of arming the weapon, as much as we could arm it. Pretty much all nuclear systems, it's a two-man system, a two-key system, like the systems they had on the intercontinental ballistic missiles, like they had two people separated and their arms weren't long enough to put in two keys, so it's just a safety effect. But in our case, we had to arm it as we could, and then the little support detachment we had would've deployed with us in war came in and did something which would have allowed that weapon to be fired, and it was called PAL, and all of those nuclear weapons had PAL, it was a Permissive Action Link. So they'd go in there and do something or other, and we didn't know what they were doing. But it meant that they had to do the final arming of the weapon. So if we deployed in war, and even on exercises, we'd have our little detachment with us and so when we did these things in the field, even with our training rounds, we went through the same drills, because everything was just drilled into us. We had to do every single step of the requirement. Well, nuclear weapons are nuclear weapons. (21:20) And we never had a real problem. Lots of countries had problems, lots of countries had Honest Johns, I think in one case they hadn't unlocked the launcher, so when they fired the weapon, it took the truck with it down the firing range, and then it sort of blew up [laughing]. [NT: did SSM battery have its own service units?] (22:00) We had our own mechanics, but also we had our REME units in the brigade, but we pretty much looked after our own vehicles as everybody did. I mean, preventative maintenance was the way to be. In the brigade, maintenance was really important, and once a year the brigade ran a technical inspection, where they went through all of your equipment, all of your vehicles, all of your radios, and you were graded on those. Well, I must say that in that last year, we topped the brigade. And also, our last NSI, after I took the unit, the brigade commander wanted to see me, Jimmy Gardener, and he said, "Ottawa thinks that since the battery's going at the end of the year, they don't see any reason why you should do anymore firing." And we didn't have to do the NSI, because you're always really working about a year ahead on those. So I said, well you know, we might as well quit today because you don't have very much to do. And we did everything as if the SSM was going to go on forever. [how the SSM battery was disbanded] (24:30) We just turned all our weapons into logistics units, and some of our stuff was sold. We sold our rocket bodies, we sold our black, in fact there was a 50 missile regiment just down the road from us, they had both Honest John and 8-in, and they used to borrow our black to do their NSI, because they knew it pulled the best. A lot of them [the SSM soldiers] went back to Canada, others went to the regiment in the brigade.Fluctuations in emphasis upon conventional vs. nuclear: [NT: when Canada lost tactical nuclear ability, did it change the perception in regards to our ability to fend off Soviet aggression? How did disbanding SSM and moving South change Canada's role?] (26:15) I suppose a lot of us probably thought that it was a dumb decision, we should've carried on until the Soviet threat died down a bit...when you could get rid of nuclear weapons. But, to do what Trudeau and Hellyer did, putting us into green uniforms, and Trudeau was just arrogant about these things.. .in fact, even when they were going to buy a new tank in the '70s, well Trudeau didn't even want to buy a new tank! And J-Dex, General Dexter went and had a chat with him and said, you'd better buy a new tank. And so we got the Leopard. They [Centurions] were still in good neck. And I think that they had NATO called the Canadian Army Trophy competition, and I think the armored regiment won that with the Centurion between 1976 and '79. The guy who commanded the regiment was a guy named Clive Milner. (18:30) Like the Brits bought a new Conqueror, got rid of all their Centurions, but the Conqueror, their weapon system, they had to load the damn thing in two parts, you just couldn't ram a shell up there and fire it.. .it was a two part loading proposition, and so they would never have been fast enough to win that sort of competition. [NT: knowledge of effects of nuclear warfare?] (29:25) We had no special classes, because if you had that kind of classes, and what you're trying to do, well, they don't really need to think of those kinds of things. You're in the military, you've got a job to do, you've the weapons to do the job, well then you're going to do the job. You don't want to start sucking your teeth and saying, well, I guess that's really morally right. ..we never had those kind of classes. We did instill in them a respect for the opponent, because there's no question that the Soviets were very good at what they did, and they had an awful lot more soldiers than we did, and a lot more equipment than we had...We had officer symposiums where you'd talk about these things. And they used to review the GDP, General Defense Plans every year (30:40), and everybody knew that if it happened, and the Soviets came pouring through the Fulga gap, we would've deployed to the Weser, hopefully, and maybe there would've been nuclear release, but we wouldn't have stopped the Soviets because that their initial tank army that would've crossed out of East Germany through the Gap and spearheaded for the Rhine, they had about 80,000 troops in there, which was about the same as all the Allied troops deployed in Germany. Well, actually, nuclear weapons could've made a big difference, but you know, even if you start with a small nuclear weapon, under those circumstances, it's going to escalate, and then it would've been sort of game over, everything would've gone to hell (31:50). But we didn't want to think about that, and we didn't talk about it. We just said, ok, this is what we're supposed to do under certain conditions, and we're bound to do it. [NT: was it assumed tactical nuclear weapons would be used?] (32:20) Well, the yield of the Honest Johns is classified, it was a dial yield type weapons system, and as far as I know, the weapon had three yields. And one was very low yield, and then there was a medium yield and there was a high yield possibility. But I think on both sides, if we had gone to war, we would've started with very small weapons, around a kiloton or less, and that's just a big bang. And when you're talking about fall-out, and things like that, you took all sorts of things into account, to avoid creating obstacles for yourself, like blowing buildings down or trees down...and you hoped that the wind was blowing in the right direction for fallout. Normally these weapons were exploded above the ground where you would have the least fallout. So you fired the cleanest shot that was possible, and I'm sure they would've started at very low yield, but after that.. .it would've run away with itself, I think. [NT: emphasis upon conventional vs. nuclear] (34:40) I don't think we ever worried about that. That was left to the politicians to decide. The Honest John was a very simple system and a very good system. Very accurate. It would've done a good job. The British had Honest John, the Dutch, I think the Germans had them...Our special ammunitions site served us and 50 missile regiment, and I think that was about all. They had them all situated as close as possible to nuclear units for ease of out-loading and moving on to war.Leopard vs. Centurion: (36:15) I think that the Leopard tank was far superior to the Centurion. But one of the main factors was the Leopard was an awful lot lighter. The Centurion was between 50-60 tons and I think the Leopard was somewhere around 40 tons. And I think that was one of the biggest problems, because there were so many bridges to cross between the Rhine River and the Weser when they were deploying and. even on exercises.Differences brought about by the move: (39:30) It was very odd to say the lease, because an infantry brigade group, mechanized brigade group was on a couple of air fields. That's not normally where you find them. And we were a long way from our GDP positions. But essentially, we had a different role. We definitely had an offensive role as part of the British Army of the Rhine, but there (down South), it was a reserve role. But I mean, they got in there and got themselves sorted out, and they did their exercises and...they changed their organization a bit to conform more with American...the brigade was still commanded by a brigadier general, but the senior staff officer under the British system was called a Brigade Major....But they had a good role, they exercised. The Americans had some big exercises (40:55), where they would bring some of the units over and would move forward to GDP positions and they would go into an exercise phase, and in about '72 in one of those big exercises, under General Chouinard, and the brigade was the enemy, and they completely...he looked at the map and they checked out these tiny little roads and forests and things, and they bypassed and hit the American division in the flank, and they were surprised. None of the umpire staff knew how they could possibly get there without being seen or heard. And they stopped the exercise and sent the Canadian brigade back and said, hey, follow this (as in other) scenario.Role of Canada in defense of Europe: (43:50) I think it was really an essential unit until they went South. They had an important GDP position; they were probably as well trained or better trained as any other units in the British Army of the Rhine, they were highly respected. They were proud of themselves...good soldiers. [NT: did any of it change when they went South?] No, as I said earlier, they adapted very quickly. And did an outstanding job when I was there, and in fact I went out and did some umpiring...and they were really good. It never entered my mind that we were doing anything other than the best and playing an integral part in the defense... I think the BAOR was pretty sad to see us go; because they had to fill the hole, and it was a considerable one because of the size of our brigade. It was a very powerful organization.Canada's specific responsibilities: (46:10) We would've just deployed into positions behind the Weser and they were all preselected. Every nuclear unit knew where they were going and had an idea of the of the part that had been involved. [And then in Lahr] You see, that was one of the biggest problems, because we weren't on the line, we had a long way to go, in fact all the NATO forces had a long way to go to the forward positions. And they had a lot of tanks and a lot of vehicles...and in a crisis situation, every road and train would've been packed with vehicles, civilians would've hopped in their cars and they would've been trying to drive to the channel. It WO\l'd've been a total mess. That sort of scenario was debated often. It's so simple, you know, but it would've been just about impossible (48:00). And when we moved there was a whole bunch of Soviet spies in West Germany, and they probably had just about every bridge targeted, and we never would've made the GDP positions. I believed that we wouldn't reach our GDP positions. There were two scenarios for a Soviet attack: we would be given some warning in terms of their preparation or they got up one morning, everybody loaded up and started driving for the Fulga Gap and the north German plane. And they would've been there before us. A lot of the buildup of the 8th tank army was fairly close to the East German border.. But when things are difficult like that, you just don't want to think about them.Ideological education by Canadian govn't: (50:10) None. Every army pretty well does the same things with some variations. The Soviets did an extremely heavy amount of training on bridging...and because they would've had to bridge the Weser and all sorts of other little streams...Integration within the German community: (51:50) They were great; at least in our brigade area, well, there was the odd little punch up in Lahr, but generally speaking, they liked the Canadians and when we moved South, they were very happy to get us in Lahr, and we built up a very nice reputation with the Germans in Lahr before we left there.Trudeau brings military closer to home; comments: (52:30) That's what politicians are paid for. I think everybody was trending that way because when we first did our NATO buildup, we were sucking a lot of money out of the national budget, a very large percentage was coming out of the budget. I mean, there was virtually nothing left, we could barely produce 2000 soldiers to put them on the ground.Cold War no longer hot: (56:00) Reason started to prevail over time on both sides (56:30).. .I'm sure that there were times when nobody really knew what was going to happen. And that's what we were trying to prevent when NATO had these forces.Most significant changes with 4 CMBG: (57:40) I think Canada's role in NATO was on a descending curve over time. Because in around '54-'55, when they reconstituted the 1st Canadian division, that was after our first brigades came out of Korea and posted to Germany.. and we gave NATO a commitment to have a division with 1 brigade forward deployed, which was the NATO brigade...(59:00) We were all excited to be part of that first division...And then next thing you know, it's gone. And next thing you know we started to renege on our larger commitments to NATO and we ended up with our brigade in Europe, which they always kept pretty scookum...Other: (1:15:50) I forgot to mention one thing about the SSM, and this also applied to the air nuclear is that everyone that was close to or involved with nuclear weapons had to have a human reliability program that was checked every year, so you would know if he drank too much, or. ..all the soldiers who were selected for that had to have a real clean slate. [NT: after Canada dismantled the SSM battery, did someone fill the hole?] (1:21:15) I don't know, but they had lots still (American and British...). (1:22:45) We had a series of envelopes kept in a safe, and if we ever had to deploy, we would take these envelopes along with us and at a certain stage we would get a message either passed by our small detachment or from division or corps and we would open the envelope and we would go and see our detachment commander, and he would open his, and if they had the same codeword, that means a weapon would be released and shortly after that we would've got a weapon on yield. But that would've allowed us then to mate that weapon and set the yield...we would go through the drill so we all understood the drill...we would have phony envelopes made up and the real ones never left the safe, and periodically they were changed. In Fort Qu'Appelle Caseme, doors were all barred, windows were all barred, it was the one area that was totally barred, no-body but us could go in there. I still had about 250 [soldiers in the battery] when they reduced it from 4 launchers to 2. And my predecessor manned three. And we did the same, we manned three.

In Collection:
Contributor Subject Language Keyword Date created Relation
  • Part of the Military Oral History Class collection of interviews.
Resource type Rights statement Extent
  • 1 sound recording (MP3)
Geographic Coverage Coordinates
  • 39.76, -98.5
  • 60.10867, -113.64258
  • 51.5, 10.5
  • 54.75844, -2.69531
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  • Original sound recording (DVF) also available.
Physical Repository Collection
  • Canadian Military Oral History Collection
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  • OG_762
Fonds title Fonds identifier Is referenced by Date digitized
  • November 21, 2007
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  • Digital sound recording in .mp3 format at 56 kbps and 22 kHz. Recorded in digital format by interviewer, technical and cataloguing metadata provided by JF and JP. Interview recorded in digital format for UVic Special Collections in 2007. Migration metadata by KD and MT.
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  • This interview has been posted with the understanding that it may be used for research purposes only. Should the interviewee or their heirs have any objections to this interview being accessible on the Internet, it will be removed promptly. Contact UVic Special Collections for permission if using for other than research purposes: speccoll@uvic.ca
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