Lane, Reginald J.: my Air Force recollections (April 4, 1978 - March 12, 1979)
PublicRank: Lieutenant-General. Medals and Honours: Distinguished Service Order (DSO); Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC)
Interviewee: Lane, Reginald J., b. 1920
Interviewer: Roy, Reginald H. and Chris D. Main
An interview/narrative of Reginald J. Lane's experiences during World War II. Lieutenant-General Lane, D.S.O., D.F.C. served with the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Canadian Forces (Air). Interview took place on April 4, May 9, 11, 16, 18, 23, 25, June 12, 15, 20, 27, September 14, 28, October 3, 10, 24, 30, November 6, 14, 27, December 4, 1978, January 15, 22, 29, February 19 and March 12, 1979.
ABSTRACT: Lieutenant-General Reginald J. Lane, D.S.O., D.F.C. Royal Canadian Air Force Canadian Forces (Air) (Reel 1, Side 1) Born 4 January 1920 at Victoria, B.C. Schooled in Victoria. Attributes years as a member of Christ Church Cathedral choir and as a Boy Scout in teaching the importance of leadership by example and gentle persuasion rather than by coercion. Joined medical corps militia in 1939, accepted by the Royal Canadian Air Force in September, 1940. Worked for the Hudson's Bay Company, Victoria, during the preceding months. Sent to manning depot in Brandon, Man. Elementary flying at Vancouver, Service flying at Dauphin, Man., where he was introduced to North American Harvard aircraft. (82:00) (Reel 1, Side 2) Experiences at Dauphin, topped class, awarded Wings, commissioned. Operational training unit in England; Armstrong Whitworth Whitley bombers. Describes living conditions, food, flying. First operational squadron: No. 35, Royal Air Force based in Yorkshire. Mentions that he later joined a Pathfinder squadron where he completed two tours. (87:00) (Reel 2, Side 1) Based at Linton-on-Ouse, Yorkshire with No. 35 Squadron. Crewed-up on Handley-Page Halifax aircraft. Crew duties. First operation to Berlin. Comments on Bomber Command, meteorological considerations, routes and other preparations. Claims that, partly due to lack of navigational aids, the weather returning from operations was more important than that over the target. Bombing policy. Dangers during the take-off with a full bomb load. Duties of squadron and base commanders. Promotion of experienced personnel. Briefing before a raid, weather and altitude conditions, necessity of photographs of bombing points. Effect of fear on aircrew. Efficiency of ground crew. Some air incidents. (91:00) (Reel 2, Side 2) First operational flights were made as a co-pilot, very boring. Navigational problems, 1942. Recreational activities. Raid on German ships, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prince Eugen at Brest, France. Observed a Halifax "ditching" in the English Channel on return flight. Explains flying on a reduced number of engines. First operation as aircraft captain on 3 March 1942 against the Renault autoworks in Paris. Comments on his air-crew. Replacement navigator "freezers" over target. Problem of air-crew members who lost their nerve. (76:00) (Reel 3, Side 1) Part of squadron transferred to Scotland in March, 1942. First attempt to bomb the German battleship Tirpitz was foiled by cloud. Second attempt in April, 1942 in which his aircraft was badly damaged, thus unable to participate in the third raid of the series. In total the squadron lost eight of twelve aircraft in the attempt to destroy the Tirpitz. Returns to description of raids against German ports and the Ruhr. Becomes part of the new Pathfinder Group (No. 8). Early H2S radar and other navigation aids. Describes raid on Hamburg, managed to return to base but the aircraft was a "write-off". Awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. (94:00) (Reel 3, Side 2) Theory behind the establishment of the Pathfinders. The Group became a necessity because of navigational problems and inaccurate bombing. Number 8 Pathfinder Group consisted of four squadrons of heavy bombers, all with experienced crews. Improved navigational aids. Technique of target marking. "Oboe" system for navigation and target marking very great improvement but range (beam) could not extend from England to all of Germany. Mosquito bombers. Master Bomber system introduced, in which the bombing was orchestrated, on site, by radio. Enemy night fighters, diversionary raids, instrument flying. Battle of the Ruhr 1942/43. Describes a raid, flying technique called "weave". Mentions "off-set" bombing. Describes night-fighter attack. Completed 45 operations in Pathfinders. Awarded Distinguished Service Order (D.S.O.). (84:00) (Reel 4, Side 1) New duties, operational and administrative, as a squadron leader and flight commander. Returned to Canada to fly the first Canadian-built Lancaster bomber to England. After much publicity, ceremony, etc., a complete instrument failure meant a month's stay in Canada - in seclusion - so that there would be no adverse publicity. Flew to England, joined 405 Squadron, R.C.A.F. (Pathfinder) at Gransden Lodge, as a wing commander. Points out that later on there was some difficulty in attracting air-crew to Pathfinder squadrons due to the higher attrition rate in that operation. The offer of promotion helped ease the shortage: Squadron commanders became group captains, and so on. Wing Commander Lane acted as a Master Bomber. Poor living conditions at their base which tended to lower morale. Is of the opinion that, as a strategy, bombing Berlin was not an effective one, considering air-crew casualties. Believes that "Bomber Harris" (Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur Harris) was mistaken in his single-minded dedication to bombing. Describes effect of winter jet stream on air navigation. Accidents over the target. Blind landing in the fog killed air-crews. Raid on marshalling yard in France. Night fighters. Promoted to group captain at 24 years of age. "Good Luck" raincoat. (70:00) (Reel 5, Side 1) Experienced near around-the-clock operations in 1944, preparatory to the invasion of Europe. Made his last operational flight against Caen in Normandy, signifying the end of his third tour. Introduced to his future wife in Leeds, anecdotes of leave, etc. Appointed a staff officer at No. 6 Group - Air I - responsible for planning operations. Account of raid planning, aircraft serviceability, the trying wait for aircraft to return from operations. Icing could be a serious problem; one night eight aircraft were lost to this cause, soon after take-off. In late Spring, 1945, joined Tiger Force (war against Japan) as group captain, operations. Dropping the atomic bomb postponed, then cancelled, the move to the Far East. Arranged to command a base in England as he had plans to be married. (51:00) (Reel 5, Side 2) Became commander of a base in Buckinghamshire; Three squadrons of Douglas Dakotas (RCAF) flying for the most part in the service of the British. Was able to attend a few days of the Nurnberg war criminal trials. Experienced some ground-crew agitation to return more rapidly to Canada. Defused by obtaining replacements from Canada. Comments on the considerable psychological change for pilots - air regulations and safety now became paramount. Pilots with experience in Training Command made excellent peace-time air-crew. Very different from war-time where a more "adventurist" attitude was necessary. Noticed that even he became less colourful in peace-time. The units became very efficient in the air-freight business. Returned to Canada to the air force staff college where on October 1, 1946 he was reduced to his permanent rank of wing commander. (56:00) (Reel 6, Side 1) Comments on conditions at the six-month course at staff college. Lived in, learned to write the "service way". Posted to air force headquarters in Ottawa, plans and organization, operational requirements. Posted as a staff officer to a transport wing. Claims that extraordinary efforts were made by crews photographing the North. At Christmas, 1948 was promoted to group captain. Was senior officer involved in Lester Pearson's attendance at the Ceylon Conference; first R.C.A.F. flight around the world. Resisted efforts by his father-in-law in England to become manager of his firm of contractors. (71:00) (Reel 6, Side 2) Base commander at Edmonton for two years, a base badly run-down. Able to begin improvements before being transferred to Ottawa to logistics and plans where he coordinated supply, engineering and maintenance. Comments on the aircraft industry, relations with the Americans. Involved in planning specifications for the Avro Arrow fighter. Long hours preparing budgets. Good relations with the Treasury Board. (61:00) (Reel 7, Side 1) Attended the Imperial Defence College in 1955. Gives considerable detail on the course, psychology, syndicates, personalities, and social life. Course trip to the Middle East. In their report the members of the course predicted the Arab-Israeli war of 1956, and the winner. Students at the I.D.C. were asked for input to problems facing the British Cabinet. An excellent system, expresses wish that the Canadian Cabinet would make the same request to the Canadian Defence College. Returned to Canada to the directorate of air plans and programmes. Later became chief of plans and intelligence. Emphasizes that very careful consideration was given to every phase of air force operations. (55:00) (Reel 7, Side 2) Planning for the Avro Arrow fighter aircraft. A state-of-the-art machine, but very expensive. By 1957/58 it was having a serious financial effect on the defence budget. Either large additional sums of money were required, or the prospect of cancellation had to be faced. As well, Canadian specifications made the Arrow less adaptable to the needs of other countries. Lane had the very difficult job of recommending to the chief of the air staff that the Arrow be cancelled. Considerable drop in morale at air force headquarters when cancellation became a fact. In 1961 was promoted to air commodore, chief of plans and intelligence. (68:00) (Reel 8, Side 1) Comments on the production of various aircraft. As chief of plans great emphasis was placed on "management". Describes the position and that of the four directorates within the organization; policy, plans (international), air plans, and intelligence. Planning was a group process, but always got some result on paper! Bomarc missiles - trouble with nuclear warheads and the Cabinet. How NORAD defences worked, including consultation process which was supposedly required. In practical terms the senior Canadian officer (deputy commander of NORAD) spoke for Canada, most often due to insufficient time to consult Ottawa. Discusses "Rules for engagement" - when an enemy could be destroyed. Planned movement of the army by air. Instigated around the world training flights. Given command of air transport command. (62:00) (Reel 8, Side 2) Relied heavily on British and American sources for air intelligence. Feels that the Americans are much better at gathering information than they are at reaching conclusions from it. The U.S. was very willing to share information with the Canadians, especially if the Canadians had made an effort to assist them in some way. Training command moved to Winnipeg amidst some hard feelings and air transport command took over the base. Difficulties with the Canadair Yukon transport aircraft. Emphasizes safety in training and the great boon conferred by various Link (ground) trainers. First class facilities at Trenton. (61:00) (Reel 9, Side 1) Operational concept, air transport command. Levels of pilot efficiency, fatigue, etc., and similarly for the ground-crew. Air movement units were established, required for the movement of personnel and families to Europe. Accommodation and baggage facilities required. Much of this transport flying could be justified as air-crew training. Troop, passenger, and freight capability required a large staff and careful planning. Civilian airlines complained at first that they were not getting any of this business, but when it was explained that service aircraft sometimes had to fly where they would not and sometimes were shot at, the complaints disappeared. Gives an account of air transport responsibilities in Yemen where conditions were terrible and crews had to be quickly relieved. (69:00) (Reel 9, Side 2) Headed air transport command for four years - a popular command as it was very operational. In December, 1965 became chief of staff to 1 Canadian Air Division at Metz, France (and air officer commanding in 1966). It was a quick learning experience regarding the nuclear strike role. The nuclear weapons were stored at Canadian bases under American control. Authority to release came through American channels, tactical use through Supreme Allied Command. Canadians were expert at flying their Lockheed CF104's in the strike role: contour flying as low as 50 feet. High degree of navigational training required. Bombing ranges were scarce, but practice vital. Tactical exercises. Pilots examined annually, a two-hour exam on their role with a 90% passing grade. Competitive exercises very important. Tac/Evaluation teams would arrive unexpectedly and "push the button", putting the base on a war-time footing. Aircraft were bombed-up" with nuclear weapons (under American supervision) followed by a halt in the exercise while the bombs were returned to storage. Crews were constantly watched for any psychological effects caused by the heavy pressure environment. (59:00) (Reel 10, Side 1) Describes a Tac/Evaluation exercise. (Notes that each Wing always had ready aircraft bombed-up by the Tac/Evaluation team). Anecdote regarding repeat performance of Tac/Evaluation for the benefit of U.S. Air Force commanders - just first class, due to Canadian team-work, training, professionalism. Aspects of the move of the Air Division to Lahr, West Germany, where accommodations were in very short supply. Problems in taking over the air base from the French air force. Canadian anecdotes. (66:00) (Reel 10, Side 2) Some of the political aspects faced in Europe by 1 Cdn Air Div. - civic, international, and national. Comments on the excellent relationship with the French while still at Metz. When de Gaulle ordered NATO units out of France (1967) real problems of relocation occurred. The French Air Force had to move from Lahr to France, but their new base was not ready for them. Anecdote: Canadian headquarters and one Wing were moved to Germany by the U.S. Army at no cost to Canada! The French eventually left the German base - in very poor condition - and much had to be done by German contractors before the Canadians could move in. Relations with the German civilian authorities. (68:00) (Reel 11, Side 1) Assisted the German Air Force with maintenance procedures on their version of the CF104. German pilot fatalities grew noticeably less. Relations with the Italian Air Force, practice range in Sardinia. Canadian politics not quite as happy an affair. Unification and cut-backs had an effect, although the unified rank structure not really a problem since the Air Force had worked for so long with the U.S. Air Force. Tale of the Canadian naval flier who was sent as squadron commander - which turned out very well. Despite efforts to keep everybody informed regarding reductions - to keep up morale - in time it became necessary to close one base. Morale suffered when the Canadians went "non-nuclear". Blames much of the loss of effectiveness on Prime Minister Trudeau. Additional comments on the double control of nuclear weapons in Europe. (75:00) (Reel 11, Side 2) Describes the release orders for nuclear weapons and the launch of aircraft. The Canadian government ordered the CF104's to be modified to the "attack" role; i.e. "regular" armament. Considers that the loss of nuclear weapons was the worst blow in his service career, going from a state-of the-art system to virtually a state of ineffectiveness, both militarily and strategically. During this time the R.C.A.F. established a fishing camp in Labrador with the most basic of facilities on the Eagle River. Popular with senior officers, particularly the Americans. Valuable since it opened doors in Washington and in Europe, a great lubricator of "deals". Approving remarks about the American system of command, very fast once a decision has been made. Some thoughts on command of the Air Division in Europe and his subsequent postings. (62:00) (Reel 12, Side 1) In the summer of 1969 appointed deputy commander at Mobile Command Headquarters (Montreal). Components and function of this command. Severe budget problems, poor accommodation, worn-out vehicles. Some practical aspects of the unification challenge. Considers that the FLQ crisis could not have come at a better time for the armed forces. They gained considerable respect from the public and the politicians. (62:00) (Reel 12, Side 2) The FLQ crisis. A problem was created by the R.C.M.P. who were very secretive with their intelligence, to the point where the army felt it necessary to establish their own intelligence network. Describes the build-up of tension in Montreal. War Measures Act declared. Tactics adopted by the military; all senior officers escorted and public installations guarded. Some concern that the Army would be stretched too thin if a similar crisis developed in another city. Makes the point that the War Measures Act was the only tool that the government had. (73:00) (Reel 13, Side 1) Conditions in Montreal. Effective techniques of the Montreal Police in handling demonstrators. Last career appointment as deputy commander of NORAD in Colorado. Describes the operations room at NORAD headquarters and the large and complex communications system. Live exercises were common, with incoming aircraft and points out the "tricky" aspect: advising the President of the United States if an attack was real. The President could then authorize the use of nuclear weapons. Various practice scenarios were used involving the President and his staff. He or the Vice President had always to be available and the decision had to be made on the basis of a one-minute assessment of the situation by the commander of NORAD. At NORAD, the commander or deputy had to be within a twelve minute automobile trip from headquarters. Always called in if the Russians were test-firing inter-continental ballistic missiles. Points out that the U.S. had a very large air defence system, always exercising and always against the clock. (70:00) (Reel 13, Side 2) Command of the Canadian units by NORAD was a continuing problem, partly due to poor communications with Ottawa. General Lane worried about the lack of senior personnel in Ottawa who were available beyond office hours. Constantly recommending that facilities and duty officers be upgraded. As a result the senior Canadian in Colorado shouldered a heavy responsibility. (50:00) (Reel 14, Side 1) Comments on the excellent selection system seemingly in place for American general officers. Impressed with their habit of admitting if they were not entirely clear about a problem. Rule: "Never try and 'snow' a three or four-star general". As the Canadian deputy he was privy to the most secret American intelligence reports. Comments on officer's clubs, Colorado Springs, Air Defence Command vs. Tactical Air Command, Canadian air traffic control compared to the U.S. Considers it vital that Canada remain in NORAD so that the government remains in the picture. Retired from the Canadian Forces in December, 1973. For two years was Ottawa representative for Systems Development Corp. of Santa Monica. Felt that Ottawa not ready for high-tech computers. (78:00)
- In Collection:
- 53 sound recordings (MP3)
- 38.83388, -104.82136
- 45.50884, -73.58781
- 48.4359, -123.35155
- 51.5, 10.5
- Fourteen original sound tape reels (ca. 30 hours, 11 min.) : 1 7/8 ips, 2 track, mono. ; 27 sound cassette copies : standard, mono. in Special Collections.
- Canadian Military Oral History Collection
- LRJ_228
- Special Collections Finding Aid: https://uvic2.coppul.archivematica.org/reginald-herbert-roy-fonds
- April 19, 2011
- Digital sound recording in .wav format at 16 bits and 44 kHz. In .mp3 format at 56 kbps and 24 kHz. Digitized by JF, technical and cataloguing metadata provided by JF and JP. Transferred from audio reel to audio cassette between 1987-1997. Interview migrated to digital format for UVic Special Collections in 2011. Migration metadata by KD and MT.
- Rights
- This interview has been posted with the understanding that it may be used for research purposes only. Should the interviewee or their heirs have any objections to this interview being accessible on the Internet, it will be removed promptly. Contact UVic Special Collections for permission if using for other than research purposes: speccoll@uvic.ca
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