Berezowski, Julian Cecil: my Army recollections (November 7, 2007)

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An interview/narrative of Julian Cecil Berezowski's experiences during the Cold War. Lieutenant Colonel Berezowski served with 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. Interview took place on November 7, 2007.

Interviewer: Taschuk, Natasha

ABSTRACT: LCol. (Julian) Cecil Berezowski Interviewed by: Natasha Taschuk 7 November 2007 Brentwood Bay, B.C. Name: J. Cecil Berezowski Birthday/Place: CanSac SK, 19 February 1929. Parents not in the military. When joined the military and why: Army Cadets, 1944. Reserve Force artillery 1945, still in high school. Reg Army 1952. Having grown up in a war environment during WWII and having been too young to serve my country before the war ended, there was still that inspiration to serve Canada, and I had an interest in things military. Where stationed with 4 CMBG: (1:40) In, Deilinghofen, Germany, with the 1st Regiment of the RCHA, from 1957-1961. Rank when joined: Officer Cadet Rank when retired/year of retirement: LCol, National Defense HQ, 1984. Kinds of weapons used in 4 CMBG: (2:30) In Germany we were put with a 105mm howitzer. The unit immediately before us had the British 25 pounders, so that when we arrived in our compound, we had 24-25 pounders and 24-105 American mm, and it was a matter of ammunition that led us into the 105mm size. The British used 25 pounders, and that's why we had then to start with. When we got rid of the 25 pounders, Canada had undertaken to manufacture a new improved Canadian 105mm howitzer, the 105 C-1, and it was far superior to the wartime American howitzer, and we were the first unit to be equipped with the first howitzers in spring of 1958. So as survey officer, one of the technical requirements of any equipment is to calibrate the guns so you know what corrections are required to make them accurate. And the regimental survey officer must survey in a calibration range for all the guns to be fired to compare them to each other to see what the variations are (4:30). And it's a tremendous exercise of land-survey and mathematics to come up with all these fixed point at which you fire from each of the 24 guns. So when I first came over my first job as the regimental service officer, for which I had not been trained [laughing], I had been trained as a straight gunnery officer, and I suddenly had to take over the surveys, so I did homework at night, but I had highly trained surveyors in my team and two excellent sergeants who knew what they were doing, and I gave them the task of making me the best survey officer they'd ever had! And we went on from there, we finished the calibration on the old American 105mm howitzers, and less than a year later, our new guns arrived, and we had to go through that whole process again, completing what we called an absolute calibration (5:35), where you had to calibrate each gun in the regiment, as opposed to only a master gun in each of the three regiments. What complicated this aspect: our survey equipment was WWII equipment that was designed for surveying a regiment of 24 guns in the Second World War that were deployed within about two 1000m map squares. So it was all line of sight and within eye-ball range of each other. But suddenly, because of the threat of nuclear warfare, at the time we arrived in Germany, we were also changing into a new tactical scenario where we deployed defensively, to ensure that no more than one sub-unit deployed on the ground would be destroyed by a Soviet tactical missile, and that meant we had to deploy our batteries at least 1500m apart. And instead of surveying in 2 map squares with this antiquated equipment, which if you had to do a straight land measure, we had a 30m chain, you could measure 30m at a time (7:05). So we had a regiment dispersed up to 3000m meters [apart], with this antiquated equipment, it was before range-finders...In those days, I introduced a new technique that had never been used before in artillery survey, it's called triangulation. I worked hard to produce a base of a triangle that was in excess of 500m, and then I doubled the size of the triangle until I was able to shoot triangles with a 1000-2000m in a leg, which allowed me to jump across 5000m in much faster time, taking advantage of mathematics...and the aiming circles were accurate enough that we could aim to survey stakes that we laid out, we called them banderoles, they were six feet high, black and white, with a flag at the top so you could spot them a thousand meters away with a telescope (8:30). And that was the first time that any unit had used triangulation as the primary source of survey instead of straight measurement on the ground. And consequently on our first divisional exercise, this was spring 1958, after we had completed the divisional artillery exercise which was laid out by the British brigadier who was in charge of all the artillery. When his gunnery instructors wrote up the critique and the report on our two weeks at the divisional artillery camp, paragraph one described the nature of the exercise, and paragraph two was devoted to a paragraph on the excellence of the regimental survey party. Because the British artillery regiments had not developed this particular technique, and they were still in a quandary, muddling along (9:45). Training provided: The people, many of the gunners, had served on 25 pounders in Korea, and then on 105s at the artillery school in Shiloh, so they had experience working in both natures of equipment, and the only thing it involved was familiarizing themselves with a few new variations to the new guns, it was very, very minimal, there was no great training requirement, you could just walk into it. Hohnest Johns/control safety devices: (11:00) Let's go back to 1957-58, we were deployed back in a defensive line along the Weser River. ..originally the first brigades from Canada that went over, 2ih Brigade, 1st Brigade, were up further eastward in Germany in the Hannover area, but they didn't really have a main defensive line that was provided by the Weser River, and also provided some defense when it was realized that tactical nuclear weapons were available to the other side, as well as ourselves, and that they could be used, so we also used that space between Hannover and the Weser River as part of the defensive strategy, where we would have more displacement area, and the Warsaw Pact would have to move that additional distance, which gave us a cushion of protection (12:05). Now we, initially when we arrived, did not have Canadian nuclear weapons, however, the British artillery, and we were a part of the 1 British Corps, and all our deployments were directed and the defensive nature of the war we would fight was under the direct control of the British commander of the British Corps. And the British Corps had a regiment of 8-in guns (12:50). And that regiment was the right size to be compatible with American developed artillery tactical nuclear • warheads. And the best kept secret in our regiment, in 1 RCHA, was the fact that the 6 troops commanders in the regiment, who were also the Forward Observation Officers, the FOOs, they went forward with the battalions or with the armor. ..each one was issued a little black box that contained a secret one-time only tactical nuclear strike request (pause for effect), and by completing that form, identifying the location of the threat force, the size of it, and the direction in which it was moving, and providing you counted a specified number of armored vehicles from the Warsaw Pact, if you counted that number of tanks or more, you unlocked your little black box, up there at the sharp end (14:30), and filled in the coded message and sent it back to your regimental command post, which in turn, because it was addressed to the division command post, they had no idea what was in the message, but they transmitted the message to division artillery, BIRTCH, who in turn, if necessary, would pass that coded message direct to the artillery commander at Corps headquarters, and they would decide if there a NATO nuclear release had been declared, then they could authorize a regiment of 8-in guns to fire tactical nuclear warheads. [INSERT (28:30) It was a very specific number of tanks that you had to count, you had to see x number or more before you sent that message, because the number specific, which I will not disclose, was determined by the intelligence service as representing a tank formation of a certain size, and if that number of tanks didn't appear, then it wasn't a target justifying a nuclear strike...so it had to be a very specific number that was the identifier for a much larger unit, and only then would you use it.] Now, it was the best kept secret in our unit, because as a regimental survey officer (15:30), as a Lieutenant, I worked in the regimental command post, evenings or whenever I wasn't doing survey, I worked in the regimental headquarters, until promotion to Captain when I took over a troop. And when I was asked by my predecessor to sign for the black box, I did not know what he was speaking of. And that was the first time I discovered that six our troops commanders were authorized to request tactical nuclear strikes. There were three battery commanders, the commanding officers, and the second in command...nobody knew outside. of the direct command chain, that this existed. And every time we went into the field on an exercise, my little black box came with me, and my signaler always ensured that he had it conveniently located alongside the radio in my jeep (16:50). I had the only key. But I had instructed my bombardier technical assistant as to where the key was on my person in the. event that I was a casualty, he was to take the key out and open the box. And we're taking about 1957-1960. And our own Hohnest John missile battery with our own nuclear warheads did not arrive until several years later. There was a protocol, which I did not discover, until I was posted to the artillery school at Shiloh, MA, and in the first six months that I was there, I sat in on a nuclear target analyst course of 2 weeks duration, and that's when I discovered that the North Atlantic Council, the heads of state, had to issue a formal declaration of nuclear release, if in the judgment of our political leaders we were at the stage of nuclear war. They would then give the Army commanders, the Air Force commanders, the Navy, the nuclear release authority, and only then could the warheads be released to the users by the American custodial detachments who owned all the nuclear warheads at that time (19:05). In fact, we had to provide standing security for each of the nuclear warhead sites, and our brigade, the 4th brigade, we detailed one complete rifle company per week to provide the ground security for the small depot that held the nuclear warheads along with the American detachment. And only upon declaration of nuclear release would that detachment release the warheads to the user. And the same, I presume, applied to the Canadian air force down in the Lahr area, because they, too, had nuclear weapons. Fluctuations in emphasis upon conventional vs. nuclear: (20:00) It was a one-way street from conventional to nuclear, and everything we did was with nuclear thought in mind. Ergo, when we went on brigade exercises, we deployed over art area about 5000m wide, where before that wasn't the case at all, in the second world war, you deployed at 2 or 3000 meters at most, but W€ ..spread out for protection, so that if the other side used a tactical nuclear weapon, so that hopefully, they wouldn't destroy more than one battle group within the brigade, so you would still be able to put up defensive resistance to the assaulting troops . (21:15). Weapons 4 CMBG vs. weapons other NATO members: We were with the British corps, and we were using the British Centurion tank, same as they were using, so we were current. And then we took a step ahead of them with the guns when we got the Canadian 105; it didn't give us that much of an increased range, but they were better built, and required less maintenance and were easier to tow, because we were still towing them by truck, we were basically shield artillery, we were not mechanized at this stage, and when we went out with the infantry, I helped my signalers carry radios and batteries on our backs, as we trudged along with a rifle company. We were on foot, it was boots on the ground, and we dug in for defense, and if you knew there was a nuclear threat, you dug your hole a little bit deeper. Leopard compared to Centurion: Superior. I came back to Germany on a staff college visit, we took our students from the staff college in Kingston in 1974, we went to Germany to have our students who were all captains and a few majors (23:10), to act as umpires on a two sided exercise, involving 4 Brigade and a German brigade. And at that time, we were taken to a predetermined site to see the new German tank, and they had several tanks there, the German army gave us a quick rundown on the features of the tank, and then we all had a quick ride around the circuit, and it was like riding in a chesterfield (laughing)! It was superior, very smooth ride, and had considerably more armor, and a better gun. More range, smaller round, it was lighter so you could carry more ammunition, and the new sighting systems were significantly improved. It was a major step forward in armor. Leopard compared to other NATO members: (24:40) There was a major shift in armor, this was an obvious requirement, tactically and strategically on the nuclear battlefield, the unit after mine, they started converting to the M-10, which is a self-propelled medium artillery piece, which was bigger, heavier, it was armored, and .instead of firing a 28 pound projectile, it fired a 90 pound projectile, and twice the range, so it was a major up step in artillery, and at the same time we started acquiring Armored Personnel Carriers for our infantry, so that the brigade then converted to a mechanized brigade, they went from an infantry brigade where you were feet on the ground and relatively naked, in comparison to the mechanized brigade group that it eventually became (26:00). But we weren't unique, as the Germans came online as part of NATO, they had to start anew, so they acquired either American equipment or they developed their own, they developed their own tank, the Leopard, they developed their own Personnel Carriers, and of course, it contributed to the economic recovery of Germany at the same time...Military wise, they kept abreast of what was going on, and using their genius for all things mechanical and warlike, they weren't taking a backseat to anybody... Centurion and Leopard vs. Soviet tanks: (27:35) who could outshoot whom? And that changed from time to time as they introduced new equipment on either side. Serviceability of weapons systems: (29:35) I can't answer that because not having served in a unit, you'd have to ask somebody that served in one of the armored regiments in the brigade. But in our own unit, we had generally our ration of 24 guns were always available, and we had two spare guns. One was held by the workshop and the other was held by the regiment, and the other 24 were held by the three batteries, 8 guns per battery. And our own workshop that we had, a light aid detachment from REME was part of the regiment, and they looked after the spare gun, so that if somebody lost a gun, for any number of reasons, you could have a broken axle... (31:25) The first spare was right there with the regiment, the second one was back in the brigade area to be brought up if we had to have a second replacement, and if it was beyond that, well, it was tough luck (32:10). But we never really had a problem despite the many trips we made to the ranges; because we did all our live firing and maneuver training in the Hohne ranges in the Hamburg area on the Luneburg Heide where the British army accepted the surrender of the German Army in Northern Germany...and I cannot recall any accidents, like a premature going off on the end of a muzzle, on a gun, when you were doing live firing. I had it happen to me when I was an instructor (33:00) at the artillery school after I returned from Germany, and I was the chief instructor in the artillery depot where we were training recruits, and they were doing their firing practice that every recruit has to go through, and unfortunately, we had one round explore right out the end of the muzzle, and one of the gunners had a fragment, just cut him in half, killed him instantly. Yet, we were in Germany undergoing operational training for three years, and we never had anything like that happen. So you never know where it's going to strike you, just faulty ammunition, and no way of telling. (38:20) On equipment: we had our jeeps and our trucks % ton trucks, 2.5 ton trucks, 5 ton trucks, and a couple of ten toners, that were used for hauling ammunition. They were all Canadian build or American built in North America, bought in Canada, and then shipped over there. And consequently, my% ton truck, I couldn't use it for a period of three months, because I had blown my tire and there wasn't a spare tire until the next lot came in from Canada in a shipment by ship. And so there we sat, we didn't have a spare time, and when I went off on an exercise, I had to commandeer another % ton truck from within my troop, so that meant that somebody else had to go without a truck when I needed that truck to go up to the sharp end with the infantry. So that was a complicating factor aside from the ammunition problem, being a different caliber, but spare parts for Canadian vehicles couldn't come through the British supply system, that was purely British, and we had to bring stuff in from Canada, and there was a terrible delay there. Or, in some cases, it would be compatible with the American vehicles, so then we'd have to go beg, borrow, or steel to get replacement parts. So that created a problem, and obviously the workshops spent a lot of time carrying out liaison with our American friends to the South (40:30). Role of Canada in defense of Europe: (34:00) we were defending a front line spot in the NATO defensive line. We were part of the main defense. (53:20) The Weser River became the British main defensive line, and as I had mentioned earlier, they had deployed troops much further eastward than the Weser River, up in the...up North of Lubeck, up in that area, it's a case of trading space for defense, now there was far more space to the Rhine River, but if you made the Rhine your main defensive line, there wasn't too much of Germany left, you weren't defending Germany. And once they got to the point where the Germans were starting to run their own country, we were obliged to provide for the defense. of West Germany, they were now a NATO ally. So we initially, the British were up in Hannover area, and they were going to trade space for defense, they had enough ground that way, that they could fall back, strengthening the defense, while the other side is stretching out, but that defense wasn't credible anymore with the tactical nuclear weapons (55:25). Space didn't offset the effect of tactical nuclear weapons. So we had to find a point where we were defending West Germany, as well as the Atlantic wall, and we had to have some defensive obstacle to slow them down, and then of course, it was the inspiration to acquire allied tactical nuclear weapons that could be used against the Warsaw Pact if they were attacking in mass, and had resorted to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. So that's when the decision was made by the British corps to fit the defense to the geography and the political realities of West Germany no longer being an occupied country (56:25). Canada's presence was essential: T/F: Yes. (49:50) For the three years we were there, in 4 CIBG, there was no German army committed to the defense of Germany at that time. It was still the Americans, the British, the Belgians, the Dutch that were there; ..other than the Canadians, the others were occupation forces. And right up to 1960 in Operation Holdfast, that was the first test of a German division to accept them into the NATO infrastructure to defend their own country. There was no standing German forces up until that time. And so one of the problems NATO had was finding enough troops from enough contributory countries to put troops on the ground in the event there was an attack (51:00). Now, there was some behind the scene arrangements where German units that were under training, you can be sure that they would've been brought into the defense, but there had to be a formal process, because the Russians had a say in this as well, you know, they were using East Germans, in the defense, as part of the Warsaw Pact, and they ignored some of these protocols, but one of the things we had to ensure was that when we brought West Ger troops into our orbit, our organizational battle group, the Russians had to be told about it, because they were a signatory to the German surrender. So there was a very important geopolitical problem confronting us in using German troops, and eventually, it was only after Holdfast that we started using German troops in the defense of their own country, and by the time we reached the stage when Mr. Trudeau decided to withdraw Canada out of NATO completely, by that time, the Germans had a couple of German corps on the ground, and they were part of the game, organized more or less along American lines, but improved locally to fit the German temperament. First with American equipment and then they developed their own equipment which gave their heavy industry a boost up, because they started building their own tanks and guns and ships, and now they even build ferried for us (52:55). Action 4 CMBG prepared to take: (34:35) We were prepared to carry out any orders that were issued to us by our corps commander of the 1st British Corps through the Division Commander, and we were always attached- the first couple of years we were with 2nd British Div, and then we switched the last year to the 41th British Div- but we were always part, we were the 3rd Brigade group, of a British division. And we were bigger, in some respects, than the British brigades. We were operating on the basis of a brigade group, and the British brigades operated as part of a division, and the support elements, like the tanks and the workshops and so on, are grouped centrally within the division resources, whereas in the case of the Canadian brigade group, we were self-contained (35:35). And we received our ammunition specially delivered from the Americans up to :the British, and this sometimes provided difficulties, there would be a hiccup getting training ammunition. We did keep a certain stock for operational purposes on the ground, but for training sometimes, it was not replenished soon enough for the scheduled exercises, because it had to come up from the Americans, the 105mm ammunition, which the British didn't produce, they were still using 25 pounders with 25 pounder ammunition (36:25), so that provided some complication. And then another complication we had, and this affected me personally with my OP party, my observation party. Originally when we arrived, we still had Bren gun carriers, those crazy little size-of-a-jeep armored vehicle, and half the time they wouldn't run, they had no overhead cover of any kind, so we didn't use them, because they were a greater threat to you than to the enemy..So we just simply road in jeeps and dismounted and dug in the ground. I would follow along with the company commander as a FOO with him, he'd be going down a track or whatever in his jeep, and I'd be in my jeep right behind him (37:15), and we'd talk to each other by radio, and I always had two radios when we were traveling. I had my signaler in the back listening on the regimental net, and I'd be listening on the battery net on one ear and the battery net on the other so I could talk to the company commander in the vehicle ahead of me, and this was all pretty normal, no need to give it too much concern. But I'm not sure how successful we would be when the bullets start flying, as opposed to traveling in the armored vehicle as it's turning out in Afghanistan today, everybody travels in an armored vehicle to survive. Canada's specific responsibilities: (40:35) They were considered fixed defenses along the Weser River, they weren't occupied, they weren't fixed like the Maginot line, but it was fixed on a map, and key people, myself initially, as the survey officer for the regiment, and then subsequently as a troop commander Forward Observation Officer, key people went forward to those areas on the Weser River that were considered our primary deployment locations. And the first time we went, I was interested in the entire brigade area, because I would have to do survey across the whole area for the three batteries deployed behind their forward battalions. (41:40) And it was kind of amusing because we were told not to take any military vehicles, and not to wear our uniform so we wouldn't attract attention. And because one of the strange agreements between Warsaw Pact and . NATO on either side of the line, and they were called SOCSMITHS on our side for the Soviet mission in Europe who were keeping track of what we were doing to avoid any surprises or accidental firing your weapons when nothing was happening but you thought something was happening. (42:30) And on the other side we had BRITMIX, and in fact we had several Canadian officers, and I think Colonel Walters, if you interview him, he served a year or two in Berlin with the British military mission in Berlin, and he went around looking at things, you see...And so if we had appeared in uniform in the emergency deployment positions overlooking the Weser River, and SOCSMITHS would undoubtedly have seen us, and they wouldn't have had to be too brilliant to decide that maybe that's where the units might deploy if the balloon goes up( 43:15). So we were told to go in civilian clothes and use your own cars, don't take any military vehicles. So there we went on reconnaissance, the first one I went on as a survey officer, I was looking across the whole area as I drove around in our car, our family car [laughing], there we were, all the officers wearing their standard trench coats, we called them the Maple Leaf coats, they were sold in the Maple Leaf Services, and this was a new coat designed specifically for the Canadian Army, and only Canadian officers wore this particular pattern of trench coat (44:05). Very good coat. Slightly different shade from a tan color...but distinctive enough that it was recognizable from a distance. And there we were, trudging around, it was a rainy day in autumn, trudging around in our trench coats, and moving around in our private cars, but all of them had blue and white license plates on them that said 'Canada' [laughing]- best kept secret of the day! But we did go and look at those areas, but we never exercised in those areas•, but we had to know where they where so that we could move there (44:45). And in conjunction with that, the first line ammunition for the artillery, our first line was 40 rounds per gun. And that was held in our fort, loaded on trailers and ammunition trucks, 5 toners, 10 toners, and all that ammunition sat there aboard the vehicles, and when you got a warning order to bug out, we had to hook up and move all our guns that were with us, we had our guns, we had our vehicles, and we had our ammunition. All that had to be moved out of our camp, Fort Prince of Wales, in fact there was an area between the officers mess and the sergeants mess where we had the magazine. And everything was on wheels. And we ran into an embarrassment . the third year we were there (46:10), all the equipment had been in use for about 5 or 6 years, and most of the time they just sat there loaded with ammunition, and the weight of the ammunition eventually made the springs on the trailers reverse their shape, the metal fatigue had caused the springs to get. ..so. there was a great panic for about a 3 month period when they brought in springs to replace the springs on all the trailers that were carrying ammunition (46:40). So the gunners had to unload the ammunition off the trailer so the springs could be removed and then replace them with the new springs, and all of this had to be moved every time we had a practice bug out. We never knew if it was for real or not, when you got the code word, it was 'quick train,' (47:00) and it would come through from brigade headquarters, day or night, usually about 8:00 at night. The duty officer at the unit would get a pHohne call, the brigade duty officer would identify himself, and just simply say, 'quick train.' And you responded 'quick train,' the time is so-and-so, the time that you received this order, and then you immediately notified the commanding officer, and then the team went out to the married quarters, blasting the horn as they went up the streets in the married quarters, and every block, somebody would stick their head out, and 'quick train, quick train,' and the men would just all head for the barracks, to grab their gear and their vehicles, and move all of their vehicles and guns out of the camp and into an assembly area, so that in the event a tactical nuclear weapon had been aimed at our camp, we would be far enough away that we wouldn't become collateral damage. And that was most inspirational to the dependents, particularly as you had a 'quick train' at 8 or 9 or 10 o'clock at night, and off you went, and the wives had no idea whether you were going off to war or whether this was just a practice. And we had a standing drill that if it came for real, all private care, you never allowed your gas tank below at least half, and you kept a bug-out kit in the trunk of the car, some food, some blankets, some clothing for the children, and if it was for real, the wives were expected to bundle up the kids, jump in the family car, and follow the convoy westward to the Atlantic wall, while we were headed eastward to the Weser River, to set up our main defensive line. And the question still in my mind is how many soldiers would have turned up to move the guns if it was for-real and forget about their families heading in the opposite direction on their own. I'm glad I never had to find out the answer to that (49:30). Close calls: (56:30) Not to my knowledge. We had incidents along the Iron Curtain, there were incidents. One of the funniest ones, on the Hohne Ranges, the British were doing some exercises, and it runs fairly close to the demarcation line, and this British 2"d Lieutenant was leading his troop of four guns from A to B and he wasn't very good at map reading, and as they were going along the trails in the range area, he got lost and wandered off into the Soviet zone with his four guns, and ended up being put in the bag. So then the Russians and the British had a negotiation about releasing this hapless lieutenant and his soldiers and his four glins back to the British...they kept them for a few days...but the story afterwards is the fact that the Soviets had followed them along, they were very close to the demarcation line, and they followed them all along, they knew this young guy had got lost, so they were laughing their heads off, and they put him in the bag, and went through their drill. And it was one of the British officers that was telling me • about it afterwards, and he said they could hardly keep a straight face as they went through the negotiating process [laughing] (58:20)...So it didn't create any international incident or anything, it was more kind of a local incident that was humorous... Ideological education by Canadian govn't: (58:54) Not ideological._. .historical, sociological, and political. ..In the sense that growing up where I did, communism was a despised system. I also grew up in an area where 5000 Russian Dukhabors immigrated to Canada in 1899 from the Baku area after being tossed out by the Tsar...the Quakers in the United States negotiated to have over 5000 people under their leader John Vergin Lordly, move to Canada and be given free land. And they happened to settle in my area, in Yorktown area, and so we were familiar with Russians, and through the '30s, collectively, us and them included, we thought it was terrible wh

Interviewee: Berezowski, Julian Cecil, b. 1929

Rank: Lieutenant Colonel. Medals and Honours: Canadian Forces Decoration

In Collection:
Contributor Subject Language Keyword Date created Relation
  • Part of the Military Oral History Class collection of interviews.
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  • 1 sound recording (MP3)
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  • 39.76, -98.5
  • 60.10867, -113.64258
  • 54.75844, -2.69531
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  • Original sound recording (DVF) also available.
Physical repository Collection
  • Canadian Military Oral History Collection
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  • BJ_758
Fonds title Fonds identifier Is referenced by Date digitized
  • November 7, 2007
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  • Digital sound recording in .mp3 format at 56 kbps and 22 kHz. Recorded in digital format by interviewer, technical and cataloguing metadata provided by JF and JP. Interview recorded in digital format for UVic Special Collections in 2007. Migration metadata by KD and MT.
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  • This interview has been posted with the understanding that it may be used for research purposes only. Should the interviewee or their heirs have any objections to this interview being accessible on the Internet, it will be removed promptly. Contact UVic Special Collections for permission if using for other than research purposes: speccoll@uvic.ca
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