Peacock, Robert S.: my Army recollections (October 7, 2007)

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ABSTRACT: LCol Bob Peacock Interviewed by: Natasha Taschuk Interview: 30 October 2007 MacPherson Library, Victoria, B.C. Name: Bob Peacock, 30 Oct, 2007 Birthday/Place: Walkerville ON, 1929 Parents in the military: No When joined the military and why: Decided early on in WWII and decided that I, being a student of history, wished to be part of the organization. Tried all the examinations for military college and survived 4 years to get commission. Infantry. Where stationed with 4 CMBG: 1955-1957 2nd Brigade; Went to Soest in fall '55 with 1st Battalion PPCLI; Camp Zvoel, camp Deilinghofen; trained for 2 years. Went back under 4 CMBG from 1963-1969; 2 of these years seconded to Br. Commanded 2nd Battalion Mechanized battle group '67-'69. 8 Years with Brigade in operations sense. Then 2 years in Vienna with 1970s Mutual Balance Force Reduction Conference as Can. Military Advisor negotiating with Warsaw Pact. "Very hot time from about 1949 to well on into...the coming down of the Berlin Wall. Never a dull moment." [All time in Soest] Rank when retired/when retired: Retired LCol, 1982. Kinds of weapons with 4 CMBG: 1955: basically WWII weapons. The gunners had 25 pounder guns, very light...we were using..uh..old model Centurion tanks, and as far as the infantry was concerned, we had trucks or we had nothing. (5:00) We had bolt action rifles, Bren guns, Vickers machine guns, 17 pounders, 3-in/81mm mortars.. .it was just the same equipment we had in Korea and which was available 1944-1945 in the Canadian army. • New equipment didn't start coming in until late 50s...uh, 1963, we were motorized. :X ton trucks to move us quickly around the area. I was in charge of bringing the first group of Armored Personnel Carriers in.. .I was an operations officer at the time, and retraining the unit to handle mechanized warfare. Then went up to the British and did the same with them and then came back down and commanded this mechanized battle group. Now a mechanized battle group is, at that time, four infantry rifle companies, . completely mounted in APCs, with tow-anti tank weapons, recoilless rifles, mortars, a very powerful organization (6:30). On top of that, • you had a troop of engineers; you had a squatter in the tank, and the direct support always of a battery of self-propelled 155 howitzers on trucks. So it was a very powerful thing, and that went on until late 1968 when Mr. Trudeau started hacking away. You know, it took us 20 years to build that force plus the other forces in Canada to an internationally agreed level of supremacy. ..then it went down to.. .uh. Training provided: We trained all the time. Mostly unit courses, but there were brigade courses or courses at various schools on the introduction of weapons and once the weapons were installed then most of the training was done under a controlled system by the experts in the unit. For example, during my youth I was a mortar platoon officer, and we continued to train people on mortars even if they weren't attached to a mortar platoon, so we had a backup of training throughout the unit. Plus you could use that same training to handle not 81mm but 60mm and your problem was having people trained to match the weapon. Training is your business. If you're not training you're not doing very much. Honest Johns/control safety devices: (8:30) There were Honest John...we trained with that in Wainwright. . .I've seen it fired two or three times.. .it was an obsolete weapon from the moment it was produced because there are an infinite number of weapons that are far better, but this was the one we had. Yes, there were nuclear weapons available, and they were within 20 minutes drive from our cantonment (9:30), the artillery and the Patricia's were in the same general area. The control was under Americans...and we were in charge of security. The brigade provided one infantry Rifle Company 24 hours a day 7 days a week, and a platoon of the company was fully armed and providing security at this storage place and the battle company was on 20 minutes notice to be there. And this rotated between regiments, so there were 12 infantry companies, so every 12th week, your company got this 2417 task. When I was with the British, we had a nuclear storage place just north of Hanover, and that provide the backup for 1 British Division, 2 Br Div, and the Dutch. So, yes, they were available and we trained in everything that we did, we did under the threat of nuclear war, which made most of us very cynical, because even if you have witnessed this in a movie, the idea of theory and practice, the idea of getting men to move through this...there has to be another way... (11:30) An other way was Mutually Assured Destruction.. .It was nuclear weapons were available and considered a valid option for solid tactical reasons. We were outnumbered 4 to Fluctuations in emphasis upon conventional vs. nuclear: Oh yeah. When we first went there in the '50s, this was a for-real possibility...the defense line was the Rhine. Now Germany came back into the fold and said that isn't good enough, so the line went forward to the Wesser River (13:00) and as the Germans got more and more troops and units changes, our whole concept changed and we moved it up to the East German border. .. and so you had the whole of Germany in which you're playing. On the other side, in the Soviet ground forces in Germany, you had 27 divisions, of which 7 were fully armed. The rest were motorized rifle divisions, each with a regiment of armour. Add to that, 50,000 Bundespence Polizei from the East German side, plus 7 or 8 German divisions plus 5 Czech divisions, plus 22 divisions of Poles, and so on. And we're sitting there with 7 divisions spread across Northern Ger. . .it eventually got up to about 20 divisions, but ah, nuclear weapons were the only way you were going to stop this...and the other side knew it. Now they said they would use them too, but who knows. The threat had to be there because we didn't have anything else (14:50). We were doing more and more conventional training throughout the '60s. The nuclear thing was still there, but the weapons numbers imbalance such that we could defend ourselves, because you need anywhere from 3 to a 10:1 advantage to make a victory and our equipment was improving, we had more aircraft, and they had the nuclear weapons. We laughed and said. we're practicing mechanized guerrilla warfare. Battlegroups going around, highly mobile, plugging holes and holding pieces of ground, knowing Russian tactics and East German tactics. And through the '60s and into the '70s it became more and more back to conventional, if that is any saner than nuclear warfare, I don't know. (16:20) Weapons 4 CMBG vs. weapons other NATO members: They compared quite favorably. The Br went through a complete rearmament through the late 1950s and while I was with them they were getting the product of their development. They had a whole new family of tanks, a whole new family of APCs, and self­ propelled artillery and what have you. So they were in pretty good shape, given the growing pains of any new weapons system. Adjusting your logistics to cater to a whole new weapons system. For example, in winter weather the Centurion tank would take 4-5 gallons per mile. The Leopard would get 2.5 miles per gallon (17:40). You see the difference. The imbalance of equipment as it came in 2nd division, for example, we had 4 different types of helicopters, each required different types of fuel. So you have to rationalize these and then come back and say alright, all these go over to one division, so as to reduce your logistic overload. In the Canadian brigade, our APCs were diesel, that was good. And with the APCs, we outran our Centurions all the time, so we were just delighted any time we could hook up with a German panzer battalion, driving Leopard 1s, because then we could move at the same speed as they could move, because otherwise, hell, we could walk as fast as the Centurion. Don't let me knock the Centurion too much, it has a magnificent gunnery system (18:45). We used to win the Canada cup for armored proficiency in NATO year after year. The Centurion was a nightmare to maintain. It had two Rolls-Royce Marlins in the back, and to change that engine was a 24 hour job, whereas a Leopard you could change the engine in 40 minutes. Same thing with our APCs...we could change an engine in the field with my unit mechanics and have it on the road in probably about an hour if we had everything there. And the British with their 432 APC, that was a major workshop job. So, you know, British have never been great at maintenance. If you've ever owned a British car, you know what I'm talking about- it's always awkward to do. And the Americans may not have as good a product and the Germans maybe not as good a product, but you can sure maintain the hell out of it. And the Russians learned simplicity with the T-34 and all their equipment and did very well with it (20:00). Leopard vs. Centurion: Speed, cross country ability, maintenance, economy of fuel, crew comfort. It had an extremely good gunnery system which the Germans took from the British. By the way, the Canadian Leopards were upgraded with a new gunnery system; the vehicle hasn't changed, but the gunnery system just added 10-15 years to its service life. It was a delight to work with the Leopard, the Leopard Mark 1, the crew just loved it, they found it extremely easy to maintain. I was trained in the Royal Canadian Armoured Course School on Shermans and then Centurion, Mark 1 and 2, and I'll tell you, there's just no comparison. Centurion is World War II technology. The Leopard is the result of German thinking as a result of their experience on the Russian front. They knew what they were going to face and they designed a vehicle to do it. The Leopard 2 is infinitely superior. Both are not technically as efficient as the Abraham or some of the other new American tanks, but as a workmanlike piece of equipment, I'd take the Leopard over the Abraham any time (22:50) because it's more economical, it's a nice little silhouette, excellent gunnery system, which is the only reason you have tank, and as I say, easily maintained. Maintained in the field by the crew. But the Centurion had served extremely well. Replacement of Centurions in 1976 far too late?: No, when we first went to Ger we were using the same gunnery system and the same vehicles that were used in Korea (23:50). 20 pounder guns. That was changed to 105mm gun, which was later changed to 120. The engines were changed, and you just kept changing the engines over and rebuilding the engines until you got new tanks. Expensive in fuel, expensive in hours, it was just an expensive tank to run. Whereas the Leopard.. .it's very simple. Centurion and Leopard vs. Soviet tanks: (25:25) There was a mix-mash of equipment, of course, other people's equipment is always better than your own, this is a fact with soldiers...The Dutch they had good equipment but it was usually one stage back of the British, and it was usually British or American...but if the Americans had the M-62 tank, the Dutch were still running the M-48. Upgraded...not a bad tank, it's just not the Cadillac, we're down in the Chevrolet. Same with the Canadian Brigade...we would look at the British APCs which had better armor, and some of them had turrets and you could put a 20 or 30 caliber cannon on it with a machine gun- those were called Salidens (?). We looked with envy on those because ours were very thin aluminum ...ours were battlefield taxies, they weren't to be fought out of. You were to get your troops through a lot of rifle fire and shrapnel and stuff like that, and once you got there, you popped the ramp and people got out. An old joke in Vietnam: if you want to go to hell with your buddies, just stay in the APC, because an RPG-7 will just destroy an APC. And if you get into urban warfare or close-country warfare, the advantage of an armored vehicle drops dramatically because of visibility, and tank hunting teams go in and pick them off. So you win some you lose some (28:05). The T-54 which was the first one we ran into in the '50s, and that is an improved model of the T-34 which literally won World War Two. The next one came out very quickly, which made obsolete most of the armor that we had was the T-62, it was a 3 man crew, maybe 4...no 4 man crew. You had a gunner, loader, driver, and crew commander. Centurion had 5, so you know, you start looking at this. T-62, excellent cross-country capability in all-weather, diesel, not finished the way an American or British tank is, the rough edges are there, but it's a workmanlike piece of equipment. I had the opportunity to drive an early model of the T-62, called the T-59, when I was visiting a Chinese unit outside Beijing. It's not for me, because I'm too big, but it's great for people who are about 5"5, and one of them has to be strong as an ox, to move the ammunition and throw these big rounds into the gunnery system. The .gunnery system was simpler than the Western system...When the T-62s and Western gunnery systems were matched up in the Israeli wars, the T-62s lost out all the time. And the same thing has happened with the T-72s.. .our technology in gunnery and ammunition and fire control system has improved to a point where the Russians haven't been able to match it, and the Chinese haven't either. But there are still a lot of them, and if one goes, the other one will get you (31:20). Serviceability of weapons systems: Our service and maintenance from the unit level on up in the Brigade was excellent. Spare parts were always a problem. Infantry Armored Personnel Carriers in the mid-late '60s were off the road because of one part called a quill-shaft, it's a small thing about the size of an orange, and they cost about $75 from what I remember. But it's one of those parts on any piece of equipment which goes. And as a result you would have. anywhere from 30-60 APCs in the Brigade off the road with broken quill-shafts, and there were none coming through in the supply chain. I had 16 APCs off the road when I took over in 1967, and I got in touch with food and machinery corporation in San Diego, and they directed me to Cummins Diesel in Detroit, and Cummins Diesel in Detroit said how many do you need? So we used our training aid funds, which was not very much, and we bought a whole bunch of these quill-shafts and they were sent over through the American logistics system and we went down and picked them up. I got a big rocket from the logistics side, and said if this was an aircraft on the ground, you'd fly an engine over from Canada the next day because an aircraft without an engine is useless, well an APC without a quill-shaft is useless, this is an operational necessity. And Brigadier agreed with me and said, order some more. So as a result, the ordinance corps suddenly had to go and get rid of the paperwork and go and buy the damned things. And from then on, we had no problems with keeping APCs. We would be on the road with maintenance 3-5 weeks on various exercises all through the German plains and then on corps exercises, and in our case, we went out with 97 APCs and we came back with 96, and the other one had broken down about a mile out of camp. So we were maintaining these things, and all the units were doing this. Your maintenance levels were quite a pride to you (34:30). A vehicle down is a section of infantry off the road. So that's the way we looked...a gun that's broken down is about 12% of your firepower, so maintenance is extremely important, and people have that drilled into them, and the drivers and the crew people take great pride (35:05). Aging process of weapons: The difference between the Leopard and the Centurion is...whole crew plus all the mechanics you can find as opposed to a small crew doing regular maintenance. Not to say that the Leopard didn't have the odd problem, but when it did, it could be fixed quickly, and that's the difference. You'd have a whole tank [Centurion] off the road, and God-knows when you'd get back. The parts were difficult; the number of hours of specialized work that was necessary to keep the think up, it's something like running the sea-king helicopters out here. ..(36:30)... you've got 30 hours of maintenance- it's a good vehicle- but 30 hours of maintenance for one hour of flying, is a little out of your pocketbook. Supplies: American equipment coming up, once you got the authorization to have the stuff delivered, right on [time wise].. . The British, on the whole, a little slower, but they were slow with their own people. Germans, we didn't exchange much, except with the Leopard tanks. From Canada, it would come over like bunches of grapes, depending on when they could get a ship economically suitable to bring things over, so you would have a glut for a few months and then you would run out (38:30). We changed over some equipment, for example, we got combat clothes. You wouldn't believe what we wore in the '50s, black-yellow-orange coveralls with 1944 web[?] (38:55) equipment and uh boots that only your grandmother would wear. [me: even during exercises?] Yes, this was all we had. As a result when you'd see a unit of Canadians in the field, some would have greb-hunting boots, some. would have rubber-soled, rubber-topped boots, because of the mud and the conditions...you don't tell a man to go out. . .if he wants to wear rubber boots, you know, bless him! But we finally got all this new equipment. But it came in •size ranges which didn't cove everybody. I had this 6"6 Newfoundlander who had 38 inch arms and size. 17 boots, and there was nothing in the system to fit. And he couldn't get it from Canada, because they hadn't made them. So they finally custom-made him a whole set, and he was put off, because he liked his coveralls, black, faded to grey [laughing, joking, thinks it's funny] (40:20). Role of Canada in defense of Europe: Go back one and say "what did the people in Canada feel?" They couldn't care less! You're either an isolationist or an internationalist, and if you're in Europe during these periods [demonstrates a list he had brought of the main controversial events during the Cold War, and reads them out], Berlin Blockage, 1949, same time the Korean War was developing; '53 the East-German riots; '56, the Hungarian uprising and the Israeli Six-Day War, those were connected; and I was in there with that, and we were operationally deployed with full ammunition and everything else, to the border- we were deployed. That was during the Hungarian uprising. We didn't know if they were just going to continue on or not (42:00), and our thing was to cover the Fulda Gap [?]. '58, that was the U2 spy plane, then you have the Cuban Missile Crisis, '62, and all these things have got tentacles going all out; '67-'68 the Israeli-Arab War, and that, I happened to be involved in that, I was with the British Army, and we troops deployed in Libya (42:30) doing field firing exercises and long-range movement, it had taken almost a year to set up these exercises, and we got there out at RAF station Adam outside Benghazi, and the war broke out. And orders came: surround the airbase and hold tight. And I was prevented from going down there, I'd been doing this stuff from Central Germany, and they had a tight time. Because the Libyans were going to go along with the great big air thing...of course, that had to do with the pressure on oil, too. And then in '68, there was the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and we deployed once again with absolutely everything we had, ammunition, 55 reservists from Canada were over for the summer, we said sorry gentlemen, as of now, we are deployed for real (43:40). So we went out to our emergency deployment areas, the whole brigade, the divisions and everything else, and Soviet military missions picked this us up, so this was quickly transmitted back, that they've gone and fully loaded the ammunition and everything else, and the nuclear weapons places are offloaded; they don't know where they're going, but the Soviet military mission sent that home. This is not going to be a push-over (44:20). Then there was the '72-'73 Arab-Israeli War, and this one here was extremely important to us, because in that one, the Israelis lost hundreds and hundreds of tanks because of bad tactics. And the Egyptian anti-tank missiles destroyed them. And they lost of airplanes; airplanes are quickly replaces, pilots aren't. Every M-48 and M-62 tank in war reserves in Europe and in the States were flown to Israel to make up losses. There we were sitting with no reserves in Europe and no more reserves coming out of the States (45:30). Now, you say, well build some more. There was only one factory, one foundry left in the United States, making cast-steel turrets, and that was in Virginia, I think it was. And they could only turn out 75 turrets a month. So you can see how the power curve, and at that point, we were extremely vulnerable, because we couldn't take 2 days losses (during '72-'73). The development of the Soviet Navy (46:15), pushing their Navy into the Mediterranean, pushing their Navy into the South China Sea, pushing their Navy down into Cuba, and everything else. This is an expression, saying, we are an international power. There were a tremendous number of incursions into our airspace by bison, bear, and other aircraft. Now mind you, on the other side, there were lots of incursions into Soviet airspace. Submarine encounters, and the Sonas barrier was activated a number of times, and it smacks of the search for Red October, that sort of thing (47:10). Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs), tactical nuclear weapons...this was going on just steadily until Ronald Reagan said, we'll outspend them (47:41). And when you look at the arms expansion of the United States under Reagan and the expansion of the British forces and the French forces, all with new equipment, the Russians either had to come to terms or rebuild all their forces. Their Navy was at the end where it had to be rebuild and there was a period there between '72 and about '75 which was about the last window of opportunity they had to make the desperate effort to win. And after that it was all diplomacy because the Soviets realized they couldn't keep up and therefore it just gradually went, because by outspending them, ruined the Soviet economy, ruined the East Ger. Economy, ruined the Bulgarian economy, all this sort of stuff. As a result, over 50% of their budget, I think you can check those figures, in the Warsaw Pact was geared to defense. Ours was something like 7-8%. So, you know, you start going through this...some say, while what a waste of money- it's a lot cheaper than one day of war. And a lot less bloodshed (49:20). Canada's presence was essential: T/F: Oh, when you're on two hours notice to be out of camp fully loaded at any time, day or night, 7 days a week, for year after year, you're into a different thing than considering this an academic problem in external affairs or the cabinet bureau...when you're worried about day-care beds and stuff like that. ..No, we were very much operational and were geared to it. ..this was a very tense interesting period. And our troops, for the most part, the thinking soldiers, knew why we were there. Now there were other people that the only reason they were there was to follow orders and go off on leave, but you have that in universities, you have that in anything else. As far as I'm concerned, I was always quite aware of how close it was to breaking out at any time. I found it even more when I was on the mutual force reduction conference (51:00). It was a very testy time, and intrigues all over the place. We had more East Ger spied in West Ger, Soviet military missions around. Every time you moved, you're movements were plotted. Action 4 CMBG prepared to take: (51:50) We deployed as part of 1 British Corps, and that's 1 Division in the North, 2nd Division in the Center, 4th Division in the South, and we were part of 2nd Division. British 3rd Div would come over on reinforced alert, so they had a corps of 4 Divisions plus a Canadian Brigade and they would have a Belgian Division attached. We just went out and occupied our emergency deployment areas and waited for orders from that point. Our deployment area was just to the East of Hameln by Pipertown, and there was a place called Schwerte, just near the Schwerte gap, and our Brigade was on the East side of the Weisel Berge, facing out over the plains which led off to Hanover, and to the South East was the Fulda Gap (53:10). So these were wide open rolling farm lands fought over many, many wars...but we were stretched out so paper-thin and that's exactly the time Pierre Trudeau cut 50%. And in fact I just received orders from Brigadier Jimmy Gardner that my operational area was going to increase by about another 800 meters for a battalion, and that's a fantastic amount. And so I looked at it, and he said, oh by the way, you're losing a rifle company, and we both sat and laughed...this is just ludicrous. [under Trudeau], fall of 1968. Line of defense (Wesser/Rhine): The Rhine was the last ditch, and the Rhine would be defended with nuclear weapons...and the Germans you see, when you move forward to the Wesser (54:50), the Germans said, we don't want a nuclear war on our land, so you increase the number of German divisions, you start swinging the conventional warfare...the Wesser was the next logical place, you can wade across the Wesser in a dry summer, so it's a symbolic thing. And then you're next line is the Weisel Berge, a big line of hills and then beyond that, you're almost to the East Ger border. ..to the South there are lots of hills and forest and things like that. ..on the whole our deployment areas were in the Weisel Berge, and then we would branch out from there, depending what the court ordered, and it could be that if an attack was coming here, you might be told to go get them from the flank ...(56:00). Close calls: Certainly, the Hungarian uprising, which was crushed, but we didn't know, we had no idea then...the other side wasn't telling us, they were letting us stew, because they wanted to keep us immobilized because their friends the Egyptians were having problems with the Israelis in the Arab-Israeli War, so there's wheels within wheels of this...(56:55). And certainly on the invasion of Czechoslovakia, while it didn't come as a total surprise...we didn't think they would move in, because international pressure at the time was leave them alone, but Brezhnev just couldn't do that because he was going to lose control, which he eventually did. We had large scale exercises every year. ..they were called 443, I think was the number which gave us clearance to go cross-country and all this farmland and everything else - pay for the damage -but we treated the whole of the country as a training area, the whole area, maybe 50 miles wide and 50 miles deep, with towns, cities, villages, everything, would be in that, and we literally treated that as an operational zone (58:50). Maneuvered all around there and we learned our trade without the restrictions of having to work; on a small postage sized training area in Britain or in Canada...We did a fair number of exercises, all operationally loaded. Always ready if at any time, and the opposition knew this, at any time, we could change from training to operations, because we were fit. Our vehicles were in shape, we had the equipment. ..and this was something you didn't mention: what do you do with the dependents? (59:40). In '56, we got a separate issue of trucks, out of the British motor pool, and we prepared all these trucks, and we had decided to give all our vehicles to our dependents to get them out of the area, but then, where are they going to go? How are they going to be evacuated? Shall we send them along the roads crammed with refugees, people doing the same thing, getting the hell outta there? Basically, our dependents had to have three days rations and water and have their car all topped up with gasoline and extra gasoline and they would supposedly taken by convoy, supposedly, thank goodness it was never tried, and while we went off into the nether, probably never to return. And we would play for time until they could get...at that point they were headed to French ports on the channel, but. ..I had a wife and one child, in '55, he was 2 and 3...she knew exactly what she had to do...didn't like it, but . there was no alternative (1:00:45). Ideological education by Canadian govn't: It was available, but soldiers don't listen to that. ..more garbage...our soldiers in the '50s had an average of a grade 8 education, in the '60s it was about grade 10...nowadays, you can't get into the infantry without a high school certificate, so you can see they weren't terribly interested...that's the enemy, let's go kill him. Don't bother me with details (1:03:00). And you'd have your little briefings with your platoons and companies about the political situation and you could just see, if you wanted to put them to sleep quickly, bang! Now, there were a few people, we would sit and have very very good discussions, but most people said you know, if it's going to happen, it's going to happen, and let's not get too excited about this until it really happens, and when it does, we'll know what to do. Integration within the German community: (1:03:45) In Westphalia, it's much more difficult than it is down in Lahr. Westphalia, they'd say you have to eat a pack of salt before they'd acknowledge your presence, they're very dur. ..but when you do make friends with them, they're friends for life. We had a family next door to us, the daughter came over one day and asked my wife if she could help her with her English, and she was speaking very good English, by the way (1:04:25). And my wife sat down and saw her written work and made a few suggestions and this young girl kept coming back and then her mother came over and her father came over and a while later, it was just an acceptance and different customs. They were very curious, the Germans are very curious. There's not that great entree into the community, for example, we had our own chapels, very few spoke German, a lot of people tried, but you have to speak the language fluently to be accepted. Those who did, quite accepted (1:05:45). I bumble through in German.. .I've forgotten more than I remember. ..my wife was very good cause she did all her shopping in German and you go to all the same shops all the time and pretty soon they're addressing you by name, you know...what is the special today, oh, this is very good... Comments on leave: Your leave roster was put out almost on a yearly basis so that you could plan your leaves and you knew that at a certain time you would be on leave and someone would be covering your position (1:07:10)...this was all integrated. Very, very seldom did you get a snap leave [hey, this training area has closed down and you now have a week, if you want to go on leave now, go]... Trudeau brings military closer to home; comments: Other NATO members angry with Trudeau's lessened commitment because: If you want to say its symbolism, when one NATO partner says, ok, we don't see a threat anymore, we're up and out of here, what does that say to all the rest, and what does it say to the other side. Because we still hadn't signed a treaty with the East to curb all our weaponry (1:08:45), we hadn't done our reductions...we were at the stage where we could...personally !just felt betrayed by Trudeau and seriously betrayed...we had committed our largess, our youth, and this is our front line, this is not just something for the Europeans. Now, contrary, if, for example, Canada was invaded by Soviets, would you send forces over here to help us? Oh, well, we'd have our own problems back here, so there is an argument to say that you have to take care of your home defense before you start committing to other defenses. The other point of view which I hold is that geography dictates that we're not going to have that and you have that, and our front line is where the threat is, which is Europe. So again, you're either isolationist or nationalist, or you're an internationalist. ..I think there was no-one in t

Interviewee: Peacock, Robert S., b. 1929

An interview/narrative of Robert S. Peacock's experiences during the Cold War. Lieutenant Colonel Peacock served with 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. Interview took place on October 30, 2007.

Rank: Lieutenant Colonel.

Interviewer: Taschuk, Natasha

In Collection:
Contributor Subject Language Keyword Date created Relation
  • Part of the Military Oral History Class collection of interviews.
Resource type Rights statement Extent
  • 1 sound recording (MP3)
Geographic coverage Coordinates
  • 60.10867, -113.64258
  • 36.5, 127.75
  • 39.76, -98.5
  • 40, 127
  • 54.75844, -2.69531
Additional physical characteristics
  • Original sound recording (DVF) also available.
Physical repository Collection
  • Canadian Military Oral History Collection
Provider Genre Archival item identifier
  • PR_756
Fonds title Fonds identifier Is referenced by Date digitized
  • October 30, 2007
Technical note
  • Digital sound recording in .mp3 format at 56 kbps and 16 kHz. Recorded in digital format by interviewer, technical and cataloguing metadata provided by JF and JP. Interview recorded in digital format for UVic Special Collections in 2007. Migration metadata by KD and MT.
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  • This interview has been posted with the understanding that it may be used for research purposes only. Should the interviewee or their heirs have any objections to this interview being accessible on the Internet, it will be removed promptly. Contact UVic Special Collections for permission if using for other than research purposes: speccoll@uvic.ca
DOI

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