Kitching, George: my Army recollections (September 28 - October 12, 1977)

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ABSTRACT: Maj.-Gen. George Kitching, C.B.E., D.S.O. Royal Canadian Regiment (Reel 1, Side 1) Communications used by the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, provided by the skillful and well-trained Royal Canadian Corps of Signals. Canadian wireless sets superior to those of the British in almost every way, however they were always subject to the operators remaining alive! Communications did break down on Aug. 14, 1944 due to bombing by our own forces, the cause most often due to concucussion. Makes a comparison of German and Allied tanks. The Sherman tank was a good work horse, if under-gunned. Armoured division tactics with reference to Operation Totalize. Too much congestion. Criticism by the Corps Commander of the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade caused a sense of grievance within all armoured units. Discusses some of the unit commanders, including that of Brigadier E.L. Booth whom he believes had a premonition of death. When he was in fact killed there was a hiatus in orders since it remained unknown for several hours. Absence of control had its effect. Feels that a lack of quick replacement of senior officers let down the troops. Anti-tank warfare. Huge dummy tanks produced in the hope of fooling the enemy. (45:00) (Reel 1, Side 2) Discusses the establishment of Canadian armour. Operation Totalize. Difficulties of moving at night -- easy to lose direction. This eventually happened to the British Columbia Regiment. Problems of communicating in warfare. Complimentary opinion of the brigadiers of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division. Unfortunately all fairly new to their jobs and had no real chance before Normandy to exercise the troops under their command. Has favourable opinion of Field Marshal B.L. Montgomery. At the time of being relieved of his command, felt that officers were under great pressure from the army commander on down. Ideas connected with Totalize. French maps of Normandy were very different from the accurate British maps with which they had trained. Quite out of date (1910) and not easy to read. (45:00) (Reel 2, Side 1) Operation Tractable mounted after Totalize petered out. Quesnay Wood was a major stumbling-block. Feels that the bombing of 4th Canadian Armoured Division by our own air force may have virtualy prohibited success. The plan of the attack had been captured by the enemy. The bombing certainly interrupted communications at a critical juncture. Wireless sets were 'concussed' off net. Armoured Brigade headquarters lost in the smoke and dust. Their brigadier was mortally wounded and it took several hours to become organized. Comments again on the required changes of command. Further confusion resulted with the centre-line of the advance being changed to the eastward. There were problems with the Polish Armoured Division, courageous fighters, but language was a problem and there was always the impression of some disorganization in administration and supply. Falaise gap. Serious lack of tanks affected the Canadians' ability to close the gap. In fact, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division did not close the gap despite considerable losses in trying to do so. Relieved of his command by the corps commander; a very upsetting episode. Points out that the division had only forty-six tanks available for action. Very proud of the work done by the division. Repeats account of the interview with the army commander. Anecdote of German generals deciding to whom to surrender. Given command of a reinforcement brigade in England (13th Brigade). The Canadian army was culling all units for reinforcements who were then sent to 13th Brigade for two or three weeks training before being sent to mainland Europe. Brigadier Kitching objected strenuously to this and was able to make a few changes, but in a few weeks was appointed as chief of staff to 1st Canadian Corps in Italy (Nov. 1944). Explains the composition of the six training battalions of the 13th Brigade in which many members of other corps volunteered to serve in the infantry, but were not obliged to do so. Comments on the training offered. (45:00) (Reel 3, Side 1) Flew across France to Italy. Lunched with Lt.-Gen. E.L.M. Burns, the corps commander. Joined the headquarters at Rimini where almost immediately Maj.-Gen. Chris Vokes made acting corps commander.There was considerable shock when Lt.-Gen. Charles Foulkes appointed to command. Considers that the appointment of Foulkes hurt the whole 1st Corps. To make matters worse, the new commander was delivered to the wrong airport thus missing his official welcome. This was deemed to be an insult to the commander, but in time the tension eased. Considers that the Canadians in Italy were very good at their job and extremely proud of their record there. Describes constant attacks across rivers and canals. In February the corps moved to Northwest Europe. In order to keep the Germans guessing about the Canadian movement radio operators kept up normal, if false, wireless traffic. Explains the deliberate lack of paperwork involved in the movement. Very skillfully handled, but it required well-trained administrative officers. Lack of enemy air power in Italy allowed the corps headquarters to operate as a concentrated group. Comments on desirable location for a corps headquarters. Corps first in action near Arnhem, Holland. The liberation of Holland was a wonderful event for all concerned. Anecdote, capture of German paratroops. (45:00) (Reel 3, Side 2) German attack on headquarters 5th Canadian Armoured Division. Precedent set in order to feed Dutch civilians still under German control. Comments on several German general officers. Present at the surrender of German forces in Holland. Humilition of the Canadians to find that the Russians considered Col.- Gen. Johannes Blaskowitz to be a war criminal. Feels it was unwarranted. The German general committed suicide. Personal relationship with Blaskowitz' chief of staff, Lt.-Gen. Paul Reichelt who became a friend and later a general in the West German army. Impressed with the German army which even in defeat did not lose discipline. In 1947-1948 attended the National War College in Washington, D.C. One of the few Canadians who were, almost confidentially, allowed to attend. The practice of allowing foreign students to attend ceased when NATO came into being. A wonderful course which opened many doors to him later in his career. Nuclear weapon problems for Canada. A waffling approach by Diefenbaker. Criticism by the Americans and NATO in Europe. Howard Green (Minister for Foreign Affairs) left much to be desired. Supported Paul Hellyer in his integration plans, but considers that he behaved very badly thereafter. Able to threaten the Prime Minister and obtain his own way. Political interference in the armed forces of the highest order. Patronage rampant in defence contacts. Retired, 1965.

Interviewer: Murphy, James

An interview/narrative of George Kitching's experiences during World War II. Major-General Kitching, C.B.E., D.S.O. served with the Royal Canadian Regiment. Interview took place on September 28, October 2 and 12, 1977.

Interviewee: Kitching, George, b. 1910

Rank: Major-General. Medals and Honours: Order of the British Empire (CBE); Distinguished Service Order (DSO)

In Collection:
Contributor Subject Language Date created Relation
Resource type Rights statement Extent
  • 5 sound recordings (MP3)
Geographic Coverage Coordinates
  • 48.69096, 9.14062
  • 52.16045, -0.70312
Additional physical characteristics
  • Three original sound tape reels (ca. 225 min.) : 3 3/4 ips, 2 track, mono. ; 3 sound cassette copies : standard, mono. in Special Collections.
Physical Repository Collection
  • Canadian Military Oral History Collection
Provider Genre Archival item identifier
  • KG_210
Fonds title Fonds identifier Is referenced by Date digitized
  • September 27, 2010
Technical note
  • Digital sound recording in .wav format at 16 bits and 44 kHz. In .mp3 format at 56 kbps and 24 kHz. Digitized by JF, technical and cataloguing metadata provided by JF and JP. Transferred from audio reel to audio cassette between 1987-1997. Interview migrated to digital format for UVic Special Collections in 2010. Migration metadata by KD and MT.
Rights
  • This interview has been posted with the understanding that it may be used for research purposes only. Should the interviewee or their heirs have any objections to this interview being accessible on the Internet, it will be removed promptly. Contact UVic Special Collections for permission if using for other than research purposes: speccoll@uvic.ca
DOI

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